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MAINE’S FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM: 
WHAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE A GOOD FAITH 
EFFORT TO MEDIATE? 
By Jesse D. Stewart* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of the housing bubble and subsequent financial downturn of 2008 
unleashed a flood of foreclosure filings in the Maine courts, threatening the 
fundamental aspiration of homeownership for many Maine residents.  This 
Comment examines the significant steps Maine has taken to address increased 
foreclosure filings through the implementation of a foreclosure mediation program 
and offers concrete suggestions to further improve the program.  In Part II, this 
Comment traces some of the relevant mortgage lending practices that preceded the 
present crisis and continue to affect the parties’ abilities to achieve negotiated 
agreements in mediation.  Part III examines how the Maine Legislature and 
Judiciary have responded to the increase in foreclosure filings, with a primary 
focus on the Legislature’s authorization of the Foreclosure Diversion Program 
(“FDP”), which includes a mandate that both the borrower and lender make a 
“good faith effort” to mediate prior to seeking summary judgment.  In examining 
Maine’s response to the increase in foreclosure filings, this Comment reviews 
several recent Maine Supreme Judicial Court decisions on foreclosure issues that 
are illustrative of the Court’s current stance toward some of the procedural aspects 
of foreclosure law that inevitably bear on the strength of the parties’ respective 
bargaining positions at mediation.  Part IV analyzes the results of the FDP’s first 
full year of operation in light of the FDP’s stated objective of maximizing fairness 
and efficiency in foreclosure actions.  This Comment argues that two significant 
challenges to achieving the FDP objectives are (1) the documentation issues 
evidenced by the high incidence of unsuccessful summary judgment motions filed 
by the foreclosing party and (2) the overwhelming pro se status of foreclosure 
defendants.  Part V argues that, given the current landscape of foreclose practices 
in Maine and the positive results of the mediation program, mediation can be 
further encouraged by broadly interpreting the good faith requirement.  By strictly 
enforcing the good faith requirement and setting clear, reasonable expectations for 
the parties’ conduct at mediation, the FDP can increase the incidence of negotiated 
agreements at mediation and contribute to avoiding the unsuccessful summary 
judgment motions that have plagued the foreclosing parties, threatened the integrity 
of the foreclosure process, and wasted court resources by unnecessarily delaying 
the resolution of mortgage defaults.   
                                                                                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maine School of Law.  I would like to thank Professors 
Melvyn Zarr and David Cluchey, and attorneys Chet Randall and Thomas Cox for their valuable 
suggestions and assistance in writing this Comment.   All errors and views expressed are my own. 
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II.  A BRIEF BACKGROUND 
A.  Nicolle Bradbury and the Robo-Signer: A Snapshot of Maine’s Foreclosure 
Landscape 
On October 14, 2010, the front page of the New York Times displayed a picture 
of a modest Maine home under the title “From a Maine House, a National 
Foreclosure Freeze.”1  In what has now become a familiar story for many, Nicolle 
Bradbury purchased her home for $ 75,000 in 2003, which allowed her to move out 
of the trailer she had been living in with her family.2  She financed the home with a 
mortgage loan she was offered by GMAC Mortgage.3  For three years, Mrs. 
Bradbury made the $ 474 monthly payments on her home until she lost her job as 
an employment counselor in 2006.4  Although she worked odd jobs in an attempt to 
make ends meet, her husband was in poor health and unable to work, and Mrs. 
Bradbury fell behind on her payments.5  GMAC agreed to modify her payment 
obligations, but this only increased her monthly payments, and by 2008 Mrs. 
Bradbury had stopped making the payments altogether.6  When GMAC attempted 
to foreclose on the home, Mrs. Bradbury sought a pro bono attorney.7  Thomas 
Cox, an attorney for Maine Attorney’s Saving Homes (“MASH”), a joint project of 
Pine Tree Legal Assistance (“PTLA”) and the Maine Volunteer Lawyers Project 
(“VLP”), took Mrs. Bradbury’s case.8  MASH coordinates pro-bono referrals for 
low-income clients facing foreclosure.9   
Mr. Cox’s subsequent representation of Mrs. Bradbury revealed the fraudulent 
practices of Jeffery Stephan, the “limited signing officer” and signatory of the 
affidavit upon which GMAC relied in asking the Maine District Court to foreclose 
on the house at summary judgment.10  Indeed, the signing officer admitted in a 
deposition that he had signed hundreds of similar affidavits every day without any 
personal knowledge of the contents of the documents he was signing although the 
affidavits all averred that he had personally reviewed each individual file.11  Thus, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. David Streitfeld, From a Maine House, a National Foreclosure Freeze, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2010, at A1 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/business/15maine.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  GMAC Mortgage is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ally Financial, Inc. About GMAC 
Mortgage, GMAC MORTGAGE, http://www.gmacmortgage.com/about.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).  
GMAC started out financing consumer auto loans but has since diversified to include home mortgages, 
among other financial services.  See The Ally Story, ALLY FIN., http://www.ally.com/about/ally-story 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
 4. Streitfeld, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Foreclosed Justice: Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis (Part I & II): Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 293 (2010) [hereinafter Foreclosed Justice], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/111th/111-158_62935.PDF (statement by Thomas Cox, 
Esquire, Volunteer Program Coordinator, Maine Attorneys Saving Homes Project). 
 9. Me. Atty’s Saving Homes, ME. VOLUNTEER LAWYERS PROJECT, http://www.vlp.org/maine-
attorneys-saving-homes-mash (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).   
 10. See Streitfeld, supra note 1. 
 11. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. Bradbury, No. RE-09-65, at 4 (Me. Dist. Ct., Bridgton, Sept. 24, 
2010) (Powers, J.), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/FourMotionsOrder. 
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as Mr. Cox later stated in testimony to the House Judiciary Committee: “When [the 
signing officer] says that he has custody and control of the loan documents, he 
doesn’t.  When he says that he is attaching ‘a true and accurate’ copy of a note or a 
mortgage, he has no idea if that is so because he does not look at the exhibits.”12  
The Maine District Court (Bridgton, Powers, J.) found that this “unlawful conduct” 
was not isolated but rather had persisted for years and was a “serious and troubling 
matter.”13  As a result, the court reversed summary judgment for the foreclosing 
party and granted Mrs. Bradbury’s motion for sanctions, awarding Mrs. Bradbury 
attorney’s fees.14  The Bradbury case triggered national media attention, and within 
a month major mortgage holders such as GMAC, Bank of America, JP Morgan 
Chase, and others announced a temporary foreclosure freeze based on potential 
documentation problems in twenty-three states where the foreclosing party must go 
to court to prove foreclosure.15 
Mrs. Bradbury’s case is quite unusual in the national media attention it 
garnered, and in her ability, through assistance from pro bono counsel, to remain in 
her home long after default and the mortgagee’s motion for summary judgment.  
Indeed, over ninety percent of Maine homeowners facing foreclosure and in need 
of legal assistance are unable to retain counsel,16 and seventy percent of 
homeowners fail to contest the foreclosing party’s motion for summary judgment, 
which only increases the likelihood that the foreclosing party will obtain the 
property absent the full rigor of the adversary system at summary judgment.17  
Thus, it is quite possible that had Mrs. Bradbury failed to contact legal assistance 
and Mr. Cox, she would have been just another victim of foreclosure. 
Mrs. Bradbury’s case symbolizes the upswing in foreclosures in Maine over 
the last several years.18  In fact, in June 2009, the Maine Judicial Branch 
Commission on Foreclosure Diversion (the Commission)19 released a report noting 
                                                                                                                 
pdf.  For a thorough explanation of the sorts of practices in which these signing officers engaged, see 
Onewest Bank, F.S.B. v. Drayton, 910 N.Y.S. 2d 857, 861-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).  
 12. Foreclosed Justice, supra note 8, at 297. 
 13. Bradbury, RE-09-65, at 5. 
 14. Id. at 2, 5.  On appeal, the Law Court rejected Bradbury’s contention that the trial court should 
have held GMAC in contempt in addition to imposing sanctions.  Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. Bradbury, 
2011 ME 120, ___A.3d ___. 
 15. Streitfeld, supra note 1.  However, the banks have since resumed processing foreclosures 
despite investigations into improper practices in mortgage servicing by all fifty state attorneys general.  
See Nelson D. Schwartz & Andrew Martin, Largest Bank will Resume Foreclosure Push in 23 States, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at A1,  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/business/ 19mortgage.html.  A 
number of major lending institutions have also reached a settlement agreement with federal investigators 
in relation to lender misconduct.  See Dina ElBoghdady, Regulators, Mortgage Servicers Agree on 
Reforms, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ business/economy/regulators-
mortgage-services-agree-on-reforms/2011/04/13/AFtQxsWD_story.html. 
 16. Foreclosed Justice, supra note 8, at 294.  
 17. See STATE OF ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH COMM. ON 
FORECLOSURE DIVERSION 18 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP.], available at 
http://www.courts.state.me.us/rules_forms_fees/fdc_report0609.pdf. 
 18. See id. at 4.  
 19. The Commission was formed by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in March 2009.  See 
Commission on Foreclosure Diversion, ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.me.us/ 
committees/foreclosure.html (last visited Sept 7, 2011).  The Commission was tasked with proposing an 
“effective alternative dispute resolution process” to “promote prompt and fair resolutions” in foreclosure 
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that while foreclosures in Maine had not been as high as in some states hardest hit 
by the foreclosure crisis, Maine “is nonetheless experiencing unprecedented rates 
of foreclosures, particularly in those loans held by national lenders.”20  A Judicial 
Branch Report submitted to the Maine Legislature noted that “[f]oreclosure filing 
activity remained high” in 2010, reaching 5409 total filings.21  Most recently, 
Maine banking regulators have indicated that completed foreclosures remain high, 
although foreclosure starts have declined.22  Meanwhile, in addressing this increase 
in foreclosures, the Commission has identified one of the inherent difficulties 
created by the foreclosure crisis, observing that the “current rise in foreclosures 
represents a lose-lose situation because lenders incur increased transaction costs 
and reduced return from their collateral, and homeowners lose their homes.  
Additionally, communities lose as they suffer from the associated consequences of 
the proceedings.”23  To understand this situation better, it is helpful to understand 
the practices and principles that underlie the current foreclosure crisis. 
B.  Homeownership, Securitization, and Subprime Lending 
Home ownership has been at the center of our policy priorities in the United 
States throughout the last century and is closely associated with representations of 
the American Dream.24  Because home ownership would be an impossible dream 
for most families absent mortgage loans,25 government policies encouraging a wide 
availability of credit, including the broad use of “creative financing,” have 
significantly fueled home ownership rates.26  At the same time, economic highs and 
                                                                                                                 
proceedings.  Id.  The Commission is composed of representatives from all three branches of state 
government as well as practitioners representing the interests of various stakeholders, including those of 
lenders and legal services organizations.  See 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 38.   
 20. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 6-7.  The report also notes that most data on the rate 
of foreclosure filings does not distinguish between commercial and residential mortgages, yet the report 
indicates that according to anecdotal evidence, the vast majority of foreclosures in Maine are residential 
(as much as ninety-seven percent).  See id. at 7 n.1 (citation to footnote only). 
 21. STATE OF ME. JUDICIAL BRANCH FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PROGRAM, REPORT TO THE JOINT 
STANDING COMM. ON INS. AND FIN. SERVS., 125th Legis., at 2 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 JUD. BRANCH 
REP.], available at http://www.courts.state.me.us/publications_other/fdp_2010_ar.pdf.  The first page of 
this document as available on the State website is unnumbered with the second page numbered as 1.  
The page references in this Comment follow this convention. 
22 Maine Foreclosure Picture Mixed, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Dec. 28, 2011, available at 
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/12/28/business/maine-foreclosure-picture-mixed/.   
 23. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 8.   
 24. See Kristen David Adams, Home Ownership: American Dream or Illusion of Empowerment?,  
60 S.C. L. REV. 573, 574 (2009).  Adams notes that United States Presidents from Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover to George W. Bush and Bill Clinton have endorsed this priority.  See id. 
574-75.  See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT HOUSING REPORTS, H121-03-1, MOVING TO 
AMERICA--MOVING TO HOMEOWNERSHIP: 1994-2002, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2003pubs/h121-03-1.pdf (“For many people, whether native or foreign born, homeownership is 
their American dream.”). 
 25. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 3 (2011). 
 26. Adams, supra note 24, at 587 (noting that home ownership rose in the United States from sixty-
three percent in the early nineties to sixty-nine percent at its peak in 2005).  See also Grant S. Nelson, 
Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure 
Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 584, 594 (2010) (discussing Federal Reserve policies meant to hold down 
interest rates as well as “[a] variety of government-sponsored institutions . . . [that] purchase large 
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lows are recurrent, and the history of the United States has been “characterized by 
the ebb and flow of credit availability, coincident with economic boom and bust 
cycles.”27  The distinct elements that have defined our systems of governance and 
credit in the United States over the last century, including the enactment of the 
Uniform Commercial Code and abolishment of restrictive usury statutes, have 
provided for an “unprecedented convergence of the required elements that helped 
to create a fifty year credit and economic boom.”28  However, most recently, this 
credit boom has brought serious consequences, creating what one congressional 
panel concluded was a “foreclosure crisis unprecedented since the Great 
Depression.”29 
Many factors have contributed to the crisis, including the rise in available low-
cost capital resulting in increased pressure on investors to obtain a return on that 
capital;30 Federal Reserve Bank (“FRB”) monetary policy;31 and the rapid growth 
of subprime lending practices since the early nineties, which in turn was fueled by 
deregulation of the banking industry and securitization.32  Insofar as these factors 
increased home ownership opportunities, they were aligned with Congress’s 
longtime preference for “low interest rates, expanded home ownership, increasing 
asset prices, and widespread credit availability.”33  Congressional reports since the 
housing bubble burst have largely blamed federal policies.34  As one report stated: 
                                                                                                                 
blocks of mortgages from local lenders and thus greatly expand the amount of money available for 
housing purchases,” as two contributing factors to increased home ownership). 
 27. Alvin C. Harrell, The Great Credit Contraction: Who, What, When, Where and Why, 26 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (2010). 
 28. Id. at 1212-13. 
 29. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH  CONG., OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
FORECLOSURE MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX MONTHS 5 (Oct. 9, 2009) [hereinafter COP 
FORECLOSURE REP.], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT52671/html/CPRT-
111JPRT52671.pdf. 
 30. See Brent J. Horton, In Defense of Private-Label Mortgage-Backed Securities, 61 FLA. L. REV. 
827, 830 (2009); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 198-99 (2008) 
(discussing the relationship between capital costs and systemic risk); Heather M. Tashman, The 
Subprime Lending Industry: An Industry in Crisis, 124 BANKING L.J. 407, 410 (2007) (discussing the 
growth of securitization and subprime lending).   
 31. See Harrell, supra note 27, at 1214.  See also Peter L. Cockrell, Comment, Subprime Solutions 
to the Housing Crisis: Constitutional Problems with the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 
2009, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1149, 1149 (2010) (“[T]he origins of the recent bubble can be traced 
back to the moral hazard created by the government’s bailout of financial institutions during the S&L 
crisis and of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, as well as two decades of the Federal Reserve’s 
loose monetary policy.”).   
 32. Tashman, supra note 30, at 410 (“According to The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development . . . the subprime lending industry has grown from $35 billion in 1994 to $650 billion 
today.”). 
 33. Harrell, supra note 27, at 1216.   
 34. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 111TH CONG., THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY IN CREATING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008, at 
2 (2010) [hereinafter H.R. COMM. REP. ON FIN. CRISIS], available at http://oversight.house.gov/ 
images/stories/Reports/20100512affordablehousingpolicyandthefinancialcrisis.pdf.  See also generally 
JOINT ECON. COMM., GOVERNMENT POLICY BLUNDERS LARGELY CAUSED THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS, RES. REP. NO. 110-26 (2008), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/Research 
Reports/2008/rr110-26doc.pdf (blaming government policies, including the unintended consequences of 
certain financial regulations and housing policies). 
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The housing bubble that burst in 2007 and led to a financial crisis can be traced 
back to federal government intervention in the U.S. housing market intended to 
help provide homeownership opportunities for more Americans.  This intervention 
began with two government-backed corporations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
which privatized their profits but socialized their risks [through securitization], 
creating powerful incentives for them to act recklessly and exposing taxpayers to 
tremendous losses.  Government intervention also created “affordable” but 
dangerous lending policies which encouraged lower down payments, looser 
underwriting standards and higher leverage.  Finally, government intervention 
created a nexus of vested interests – politicians, lenders and lobbyists – who 
profited from the “affordable” housing market and acted to kill reforms.  In the 
short run, this government intervention was successful in its stated goal – raising 
the national homeownership rate.  However, the ultimate effect was to create a 
mortgage tsunami that wrought devastation on the American people and economy.  
While government intervention was not the sole cause of the financial crisis, its 
role was significant . . . .35 
It is widely accepted that the rapid growth of the subprime lending market has been 
at the very heart of this crisis,36 and to understand the legal and policy issues 
involved, it is necessary to understand the nature of mortgage securitization and 
subprime lending.  
The idea of offering a secondary market for loans is not new.37  For example, 
Congress created Fannie Mae in 1938, during the Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
Administration, to jump-start the faltering lending market after the Great 
Depression by offering lenders an immediate way to recover their loan investment 
by selling their loans to Fannie Mae.38  During Roosevelt’s time, Fannie Mae 
would hold the loan purchased from the original lender until it was fully repaid, 
theoretically allowing the bank to turn around and re-loan that money, thus 
expanding loan availability.39  It was not until the 1970’s, after the creation of 
Freddie Mac, that Fannie and Freddie began securitizing conventional (non-
subprime) loans purchased from the original lenders.40  Securitization has now 
become standard practice upon origination of the majority of mortgage loans, 
where approximately sixty-five percent of all residential mortgages are currently 
securitized, and in 2009, nearly ninety percent of all first-lien residential mortgages 
were securitized after origination.41  The size and growth of the securities market is 
evidenced by the existence of $6.97 trillion in outstanding residential mortgage 
backed securities by the end of 2009.42 
Securitization today typically refers to the process by which an investment 
                                                                                                                 
 35. H.R. COMM. REP. ON FIN. CRISIS, supra note 34, at 2. 
 36. See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage 
Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2010). 
 37. See Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2193 
(2007) (noting that early “efforts to form a secondary market came out of private mortgage companies 
which, by the 1880s, were making mortgage loans around the country through local agents.”). 
 38. Id. at 2196. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 2199. 
 41. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 12. 
 42. Id. at 16. 
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bank or its subsidiary purchases an individual mortgage loan from the mortgage 
originator43 and combines or pools a number of these loans into securities.44  The 
loans are then transferred into a trust created to hold hundreds of other similar 
loans, and the trust resells pieces of itself to investors.45  To facilitate this sale, an 
underwriter will typically purchase all the securities (i.e. the income streams 
generated by the monthly loan payments) arising out of the trust pool.46  The 
underwriter will then work closely with a credit rating agency to sell the securities 
to individual investors,47 enhancing the pools’ creditworthiness by “tranching” the 
securities into tiered senior-subordinate repayment structures.48  The rating agency, 
in theory, investigates the underlying mortgages and rates the risk that the 
individual borrowers will fail to repay the loan.49  In order to obtain a sufficiently 
favorable credit rating to interest investors, some less credit-worthy tranches may 
be insured against default.50  In addition, the entity selling the securities will 
generally contract away the right to service the loan to a servicing company, 
including granting the servicer the power to foreclose on the mortgage if 
necessary.51   
Finally, many lenders pay the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. 
(MERS),52 a Delaware corporation headquartered in Virginia, to maintain a 
computer database that tracks ownership rights of mortgage loans issued around the 
country.53  Lenders and loan servicers pay MERS dues to maintain this database, 
which members can access.54  The individual members, who are not MERS 
employees, input assignments of the mortgage into the MERS database.55  MERS 
does not verify the accuracy of this data.56  Meanwhile, MERS records each 
mortgage as the lender’s nominee of record in the local property recorder’s 
registry.57  Thus, MERS’s name, rather than the lender’s name, appears on the 
registry, despite the fact that MERS does not “solicit, fund, service, or actually own 
any mortgage loans.”58  Nevertheless, MERS purports to remain the mortgagee for 
the life of the mortgage loan, while generally the lender will pool the loans for 
                                                                                                                 
 43. In many cases, the originator, or original lender, is represented by a broker who is paid to 
market the loan products to the consumer. 
 44. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 13. 
 45. Peterson, supra note 37, at 2209. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 15 (diagramming a typical securitization structure).  
The intricacies of tranching are beyond the scope of this Comment.  For a more complete explanation of 
tranching, see id. at 21 as well as Peterson, supra note 37, at 2203.   
 49. Peterson, supra note 37, at 2209-10. 
 50. Id. at 2210. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Leading up to the 2008 crisis, MERS was legally involved in the origination of sixty percent of 
all mortgage loans in the United States.  Peterson, supra note 36, at 1362. 
 53. Id. at 1361. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Deposition of William Hultman at 127, Bank of New York v. Ukpe, No. F-10209-08 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div., Apr. 7, 2010) (on file with author). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Peterson, supra note 36, at 1361. 
 58. Id.  
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securitization.59  In so doing, MERS, in its own words, “simplifies the way 
mortgage ownership and servicing rights are originated, sold and tracked” by 
eliminating “the need to prepare and record assignments when trading residential 
and commercial mortgage loans.”60   
However, MERS has also been criticized for contributing to the mortgage 
lending meltdown insofar as it lowered exit costs for loan originators by providing 
a “super-generic placeholder” for originators of sometimes questionable integrity, 
thereby abetting “fly by night” mortgage financing61 and undermining the 
transparency of local property recording systems by developing a private database 
of mortgage loan transactions which is unavailable to the public.62  This in turn 
makes it more difficult to determine the underlying owner of the loan, creating 
“commercial uncertainty” and “inefficient litigation.”63  Finally, as one MERS 
senior vice-president has acknowledged, “MERS is owned and operated by and for 
the mortgage industry,” which makes MERS’s business model a unilateral industry 
attempt to effectively undermine longstanding local property recording laws 
without clear legislative authorization.64  As discussed below, MERS’s ambiguous 
relationship to the loan has come under sharp scrutiny in the Maine Courts, and has 
contributed to litigation uncertainty in the state.65 
Although MERS tracks the ownership rights of the loan, the loan servicer 
generally manages the pooled loans for the benefit of the investors in the trust.66  
Most loans that are securitized have a servicer, which is often a separate corporate 
entity from the originator of the loan or the security trust.67  The servicer sends out 
monthly bills and collects payments on the loans.68  The servicer is also responsible 
for responding to loans in default, including prosecuting foreclosures, mitigating 
investor loss, and pursing repayment of mortgage loans to the trust.69  In addition, 
several different servicers often serve one trust throughout the life of the loan, 
where each servicer may address different specialized servicing responsibilities.70 
Over half of the mortgages serviced in the United States rely on Loan 
Processing Services’ Mortgage Servicing Platform (MSP), which automates many 
of the servicing tasks, including default and foreclosure procedures.71  When MSP 
software detects a sixty-day payment delinquency, the servicer enters a code into 
the system, which triggers an automatic referral and document transfer process, 
directing the receiving attorney to perform specific tasks on a predetermined 
timeline.72  Thus, as one court noted, MSP “supports all mortgage servicing 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. at 1361-62.   
 60. MERS, http://www.mersinc.org (last visited Sept. 8, 2011).   
 61. Peterson, supra note 36, at 1398 (emphasis omitted). 
 62. See id. at 1403.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1405-06. 
 65. See infra Part III.C.  
 66. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 15. 
 67. Id.   
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 23. 
 70. Id. at 24. 
 71. Id. at 27. 
 72. Id.  
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functional areas within one comprehensive system, including comprehensive 
default functionality for collections work queue, foreclosure, bankruptcy and REO 
[real estate owned] management.”73  This system may maximize efficiency under 
certain conditions, but it also creates a business model that operates with “virtually 
no discretion or oversight.”74  In contrast, when a default occurs, negotiated 
solutions that avoid foreclosure require significant personal attention in order to 
“contact borrowers, collect and verify data, obtain home value estimates, determine 
whether the borrower has suffered a temporary or permanent setback, coordinate 
actions with second-lien holders, and calculate net present value estimates of loss 
mitigation alternatives.”75  Initiating a foreclosure action, however, is largely 
automated.76  Thus, from a corporate efficiency standpoint, foreclosure is the 
automated default setting for many servicers, while a negotiated solution may 
require an entirely different business approach that falls outside the normal 
functions offered by the software. 
In addition, the servicers’ contractual compensation generally “incentivizes 
servicers to aggressively pursue ancillary fees and to pursue loss mitigation 
strategies that minimize costs, even if they fail to maximize returns to investors.”77  
In fact, mortgage documents generally provide for the servicer to retain late fees 
and collection costs, including those fees associated with prosecuting the 
foreclosure and property maintenance after the foreclosure has occurred.78  These 
fees represent a crucial portion of the servicers’ income,79 which may create 
incentives for less scrupulous servicers to charge illegal fees.80  Such fee structures 
create perverse incentives for services to avoid rapid resolution to a default where 
prolonging the period between default and foreclosure may allow for increased fee 
collection, and simply doing nothing minimizes transaction costs to the servicer.81  
Furthermore, although servicers are generally reimbursed for their foreclosure 
costs, modification costs are generally not covered.82  When reimbursements are 
available, they are paid off the top of foreclosure sales, thus minimizing the 
servicer’s incentive to maximize the value of the foreclosure sale.83  This creates a 
principal-agent conflict between trustees and servicers, as “servicers’ incentives in 
managing a loan diverge from [those] of investors.”84  According to one scholar, 
this creates three problems: 
First, servicers are incentivized to pad the costs of handling defaulted loans at the 
expense of investors and borrowers.  Second, servicers are not incentivized to 
                                                                                                                 
 73. In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 624 n.9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 74. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 28. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 37. 
 78. Id. at 41.  
 79. See id. at 42. 
 80. See id. at 43.  See also generally Complaint, State v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 
2010-3307 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Aug. 30, 2010); Complaint, Walton v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In re 
Atchley), No. 08-6092 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2008). 
 81. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 25, at 45. 
 82. Id. at 46. 
 83. Id. at 47. 
 84. Id. at 69. 
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maximize the net present value of a loan, but are instead incentivized to drag out 
defaults . . . .  In other words, servicers are incentivized to keep defaulted 
homeowners in a fee sweatbox, rather than moving to immediately foreclose on 
the loan.  Third, servicers are incentivized to favor modifications that reduce 
interest rates rather than reduce principal, even if that raises the likelihood of 
redefault.85 
The securitization process creates a complex string of relationships related to 
each loan, yet the benefits of securitization are widely recognized.86  Securitization 
has significantly contributed to capital availability, which in turn has increased 
home purchases.87  By linking investors to lenders, securitization provides lenders 
with large amounts of capital from investors around the world,88 enabling lenders 
to quickly replenish their loan capital and offer new loans to new borrowers 
without having to wait for the original borrower to repay the entire loan in order to 
recover the capital extended through the original loan.89  As one commentator 
observed, securitization has created a financial landscape in which “mortgages can 
be pooled and then sliced into new securities to be sold to investors anywhere in 
the world: a (piece of) a bank loan made in Boise can, in short, end up on the 
balance sheet of a bank in Berlin.”90  
The risk created by securitization is that originating lenders who immediately 
sell the loans are less scrupulous in stringently underwriting the loans to reduce the 
risk of default because the originating lender, who will have already sold the loan, 
will not immediately feel the effects of default.91  This risk may have negative 
impacts where the underlying loans are subprime loans or otherwise carry a high 
risk of default.92  Indeed, industry surveys reveal that underwriting standards were 
largely automated by 2001, thus reducing individualized attention to the unique 
circumstances of a given borrower.93  As one scholar noted, “[i]n the world of 
securitization, with its ever churning markets, there are few long term relationships, 
but only the financial equivalents of one night stands.”94  Securitization has also 
given rise to an increasing standardization of loan instruments, which has severely 
limited any power the consumer formerly may have had to alter the loan contract.95  
Furthermore, scholars have noted that the growth of securitization has dramatically 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 69-70. 
 86. See Peterson, supra note 37, at 2188.  See also Nelson, supra note 26, at 596; Tashman, supra 
note 30, at 410. 
 87. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 596. 
 88. Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 
257, 266 (2011).    
 89. See Tashman, supra note 30, at 410. 
 90. Brummer, supra note 88, 266. 
 91. See Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in 
Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 550 (2002).   
 92. See id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 551. 
 95. Id. 
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increased the use of mortgage brokers, which in turn has contributed to the rise in 
subprime lending.96   
Not surprisingly, subprime loan borrowers have been the casualties of a 
significantly higher foreclosure rate than other borrowers.97  Since the foreclosure 
crisis began with the decline in housing prices in 2007, approximately 2.5 million 
homeowners nationwide have lost their homes to foreclosure, and a further 5.7 
million are in immediate jeopardy of foreclosure.98  The Center for Responsible 
Lending estimates that for loans originated between 2005 and 2008, subprime loans 
account for sixty-four percent of the completed foreclosures, despite only 
representing twenty-two percent of the total loans originated during this period.99  
These numbers approximately correspond to a seventeen percent completed 
foreclosure rate for subprime loans, which is nearly seven times greater than the 
rate for other conventional home loans.100  Contrary to the perceptions of some, it is 
estimated that eighty-two percent of completed foreclosures since 2007 were made 
on owner-occupied properties.101  Meanwhile, as foreclosure numbers remain at 
record highs and continue to climb,102 analysts estimate that between ten and 
thirteen million homes will enter foreclosure before this crisis is over.103  To put the 
current foreclosure numbers in perspective, the foreclosure rates associated with 
this crisis have reached rates of three times the rate registered in 1933 at the height 
of the Great Depression.104   
In addition to the obvious impacts on homeowners, high foreclosure rates 
result in significant losses for both lenders and investors, and also create third party 
externalities.105  Typically, lenders lose an estimated forty to fifty percent of their 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at 553.  Subprime loans are loans extended to borrowers that generally would not qualify for 
credit due to lower than average income and credit scores.  Tashman, supra note 30, at 408-09.  Lenders 
typically charge higher interest rates for subprime loans than for other loans as protection against the 
corresponding higher risk of default.  Id. at 409.  The subprime lending market has also given rise to a 
number of oppressive lending practices, including: the extension of credit on terms that cannot 
realistically be repaid in consideration of the borrower’s income; requiring repeated refinancing of the 
loan to extract additional fees from the borrower, even when not in the borrower’s best interest; 
deceptive practices that conceal the true nature of the loan; and extending a loan that is more expensive 
than the borrower’s income and credit score warrant.  See Nathaniel R. Hull, Comment, Crossing the 
Line: Prime, Subprime, and Predatory Lending, 61 ME. L. REV. 287, 301 (2009). 
 97. See DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, FORECLOSURES BY 
RACE AND ETHNICITY: THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF A CRISIS 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosures-by-race-and-
ethnicity.pdf. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 7. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.. 
 103. Id. at 3. 
 104. Problems in Mortgage Servicing From Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Diane Thompson, 
National Consumer Law Center, noting that the foreclosure rate at the end of the second quarter of 2010 
was 4.57%, as opposed to 1.4% for non-farm foreclosures in 1933). 
 105. Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 
2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 568-69 (2009).  These externalities include costs to communities caused by 
foreclosure flight and depressed home values.  Id. at 569. 
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investment in a foreclosure sale,106 and even greater losses have been cited since 
the foreclosure crisis began.107  Thus, Congress, local governments, and 
homeowners are not the only parties with incentives to avoid foreclosure as lenders 
and investors would appear to have strong financial incentives to avoid foreclosure 
whenever there are other reasonable alternatives.108 
C.  The Federal Response to the Foreclosure Crisis 
Federal relief for homeowners facing foreclosure has included government 
promotion of mortgage modifications.109  For example, the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP) offers government subsidies to lenders agreeing to 
modify mortgage terms for qualifying lower-income homeowners facing 
foreclosure.110  Designed to encourage loan modifications on a large scale, the 
program originally allocated seventy-five billion dollars to be disbursed to 
servicers, investors, and borrowers as an incentive to sweeten modification 
solutions.111  HAMP requires that participating lenders review loan modification 
options for qualifying homeowners in foreclosure or at risk of foreclosure.112  
HAMP also requires that the servicer conduct a “net present value” calculation for 
the loan in foreclosure to determine whether affordable modification as compared 
to foreclosure best maximizes the mortgage holder’s financial interests in the 
mortgage.113  Under the HAMP program, when the net present value calculation 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. at 568. 
 107. See GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE 
MEDIATION PROGRAMS: CAN THEY SAVE HOMES? 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.realestateeconomywatch.com/wp-includes/upload-files/ReportS-Sept09.pdf. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Justin Wagner, Assisting Distressed Homeowners to Avoid Foreclosure: An Advocate’s Role in 
an Evolving Judicial and Policy Environment, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 423, 433 (2010). 
 110. Id. at 435.  HAMP was by no means the only program adopted by the Federal Government and 
designed to assist homeowners in staying in their homes.  Other initiatives included, but were not 
limited to, the Home Affordable Refinance Program and other guidelines similar to those prescribed by 
HAMP that attached to Government Sponsored Entities following the federal bailout of financial 
institutions.  WALSH, supra note 107, at 7.  However, addressing the varied federal responses to the 
foreclosure crisis is beyond the scope of this Comment, and for our purposes, a brief description of 
HAMP suffices.  For a detailed description of HAMP and further sources regarding related legislation, 
see id. 
 111. WALSH, supra note 107, at 7. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 7-8.  Walsh offers a helpful explanation of the net present value calculation:  
The HAMP loan modification analysis uses a calculation made up of two distinct parts.  
The first part of the analysis runs data through a sequence of loan modification options to 
arrive at a new affordable monthly payment for the borrower.  As applied in sequence, 
these options include the capitalization of arrears, an interest rate reduction in steps to as 
low as 2%, extension of the loan repayment term, and then forbearance of a portion of the 
outstanding principal.  Each option is applied in sequence until a monthly payment for 
principal, interest, taxes and insurance is reached that takes up no more than 31% of the 
household’s current gross monthly income.  After the program has modified the loan 
terms as needed to arrive at an affordable monthly payment, it produces a dollar figure 
that tells the servicer the “net present value” to investors of the loan as modified.  The net 
present value of the modified loan is figured using a percentage discount.  This discount 
factors in the delay in receipt of the reduced scheduled payments under the modified 
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favors modification and the parties otherwise meet the qualifying criteria, the 
mortgagee is obliged to implement a modified payment schedule based on monthly 
payments of no more than thirty-one percent of the mortgagor’s income.114 
Despite HAMP’s promise, the possibility for success of “back end” solutions 
to the foreclosure crisis was limited from the start,115 and consequently, HAMP has 
resulted in only 230,000 permanent modifications through 2010, or about eight 
percent of the total estimated number of homeowners eligible for the program.116  
While the reasons for HAMP’s lack of success are complex, they include a series 
of lurking obstacles for investors and servicers participating in the program, 
including: a lack of servicer capacity to handle the scale of modifications requests; 
financial disincentives related to the intricacies of securitization; investor desire not 
to recognize losses; and concern about creating a moral hazard by granting 
widespread modifications given the volume of underwater homeowners.117  To 
address HAMP’s shortcomings in providing solutions for the overwhelming 
majority of homeowners with outstanding distressed mortgages, the House 
Financial Services Subcommittee has fielded proposals to make principal 
reductions mandatory, rather than optional, and to empower bankruptcy courts to 
modify mortgage balances for distressed homeowners.118  However, no such action 
                                                                                                                 
loan.  It also takes into account the possibility of a cure by the borrower and the 
likelihood and cost of a re-default.  Once it has come up with a figure for the net present 
value of the modified loan, the HAMP calculation then compares this value with the 
estimated recovery the investors will obtain if a foreclosure is completed.  In calculating 
the value to be received from a completed foreclosure, the model takes into account the 
current market value of the property and typical foreclosure losses, including the cost of 
delays in re-sale . . . and foreclosure costs.  After completing all entries on the net present 
value calculation, the servicer has two figures to compare: the estimated loss investors 
will incur from the loan modification and the estimated loss investors will incur from a 
completed foreclosure.  The servicer, acting on behalf of investors, must choose the 
option producing the smaller loss.  The calculation format allows for quick, streamlined 
analysis of the data needed to make this decision.  From the homeowner it requires the 
input of limited information, primarily recent income figures.  From the servicer it 
requires some readily available servicer-specific and industry-wide data on costs and 
losses associated with loan modifications and foreclosures.  The calculation also factors 
in data on the current market value for the property.   
Id. at 8. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster 
First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 788 (2010) (“[B]ack-
end solutions to a financial crisis . . . are likely to be too slow and too weak to reach most of those who 
suffer the consequences.”). 
 116. See id. at 763.  Braucher describes HAMP as “disappointing” and notes official estimates 
indicating that as many as forty percent of HAMP modifications could redefault.  Id. at 727.  But cf. 
Wagner, supra note 109, at 436 (“A much larger share of homeowners, 787,231 or about 23% of 
eligible homeowners, have received trial modification packages from their lenders,” although these 
packages will not necessarily result in permanent modifications.). 
 117. Braucher, supra note 115, at 736. 
 118. See The Recently Announced Revisions to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP): 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th 
Cong. 130 (2010) (statement of Alan M. White, Associate Professor, Valparasio University School of 
Law), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/Printed Hearings/111-
122.pdf. 
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has been taken,119 and in the wake of HAMP’s limited success, several state 
governments have taken action to address high foreclosure rates.120 
III.  MAINE’S RESPONSE TO INCREASED FORECLOSURE FILINGS 
A.  An Overview of the Relevant Maine Law 
To understand Maine’s response to the foreclosure spike, it is necessary to 
generally understand Maine foreclosure law as it existed prior to the foreclosure 
spike, as foreclosure is governed by state law and may vary widely from state to 
state.121  The Law Court has described a mortgage of land to be 
in form a deed of warranty with a condition subsequent defining the means by 
which the grantor may defeat the conveyance.  The legal title, therefore, passes 
immediately upon the delivery of the mortgage; and the mortgagee is regarded as 
having all the rights of a grantee in fee, subject to the defeasance.122 
This title theory conception of a mortgage “has been the accepted doctrine in this 
State since it became a separate [state].”123  Thus, “a mortgage is a conditional 
conveyance vesting the legal title in the mortgagee,” while only the equity right of 
redemption remains with the mortgagor.124 Although Maine property law protects 
the lender by requiring that title pass to the mortgagee upon execution of the loan, 
the mortgagor must rely on equity and the procedural safeguards of the adversarial 
system for protection of the right of redemption.  
Maine has long required that all transactions conveying title must be recorded 
according to state property laws to ensure enforcement as against third parties.125   
Recording serves “to protect the title . . . against subsequent purchasers and 
attaching creditors of the party thus parting with his title,” and thus acts to “protect 
the honest and to defeat the plans of the fraudulent, concealing debtor.”126  
However, proper recording is not required to enforce a written conveyance between 
the parties to the transaction.127  In assessing an attempt to assign a mortgage 
divorced from the debt it secures, the Law Court has held that “[t]he interest of a 
mortgagee before entry is not real estate, but a personal chattel.  The interest in 
land is inseparable from the debt.  It is an incident to the debt and cannot be 
detached from it.”128   
                                                                                                                 
 119. See id.  
 120. See WALSH, supra note 107, at 1.   
 121. Nelson, supra note 26, at 587. 
 122. Johnson v. McNeil, 2002 ME 99, ¶ 11, 800 A.2d 702 (quoting Gilman v. Wills, 66 Me. 273, 275 
(1877)). 
 123. Id. ¶ 10 (quoting First Auburn Trust Co. v. Buck, 137 Me. 172, 176, 16 A.2d 258, 260 (1940)). 
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 125. See Bailey v. Myrick, 50 Me. 171, 180 (1860). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 201 (2011). 
 128. Wyman v. Porter, 108 Me. 110, 115, 79 A. 371, 373 (1911) (citing Ellison v. Daniels, 11 N.H. 
274, 277 (1840)).  The United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he note and mortgage are 
inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident.  An assignment of the note carries the 
mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.”  Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 
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In Maine, after a party breaches a condition of the mortgage, the foreclosure 
process may proceed in one of two ways129: either by a power of sale foreclosure130 
or by judicial process.131  Power of sale foreclosure is not available for non-
commercial residential mortgages.132  Therefore, for purposes of this Comment, 
foreclosure will refer exclusively to judicial foreclosure, which is the foreclosure 
process subject to the mediation program.133  In a judicial foreclosure, “the 
mortgagee or any person claiming under [the mortgagee] may proceed for the 
purpose of foreclosure by a civil action against all parties in interest.”134  The Law 
Court has long recognized that a promissory note secured by a mortgage is 
enforceable by the note holder.135 
B.  An Act To Preserve Home Ownership and Stabilize the Economy by Preventing 
Foreclosure 
Faced with unprecedented foreclosure rates and limited federal success in 
reversing these numbers, the Maine judicial and legislative branches endeavored to 
design “an effective alternative dispute resolution process . . . [to] promote fair and 
prompt resolutions . . . in foreclosure proceedings.”136  The result was “An Act to 
Preserve Home Ownership and Stabilize the Economy by Preventing Unnecessary 
                                                                                                                 
Saunders, declined to address the situation in which the mortgage and note are held by different parties, 
citing Wyman as an example of that factual scenario.  Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 
2010 ME 79, ¶ 11 n.3, 2 A.3d 289.  Nevertheless, the Maine District Court has cited Wyman and 
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nullity.  See BAC Home Loans Servicing LP v. Weymouth, No. RE-09-015, at 2 (Me. Dist. Ct., 
Kennebec, Dec. 2, 2009) (Mulhern, J.); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Hartman, No. RE-08-026, at 3 n.1 
(Me. Dist. Ct., Augusta, May 11, 2009) (Mulhern, J.). 
 129. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 12. 
 130. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6203-A (2011). 
 131. See id. §§ 6321-25. 
 132. See id. § 6203-A. 
 133. Compare id. § 6203-A, with id. §§ 6321-25. 
 134. Id. § 6321.  
 135. See Webb v. Flanders, 32 Me. 175, 176 (1850); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys, Inc. v. Saunders, 
2010 ME 79, ¶ 12, 2 A.3d 289.  The state of the law is somewhat uncertain regarding the extent to 
which the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) controls issues of enforcement of a mortgage note and 
mortgage, and to what extent a mortgage note is a negotiable instrument within the meaning of the 
UCC, currently codified in Maine at title 11, section 3-1104 of the Maine Revised Statutes.  See FDIC v. 
Houde, 90 F.3d 600, 604 n.3 (1st Cir. 1996) (proceeding on the assertion by both parties that the 
mortgage note in question was a negotiable note within the meaning of the UCC, while recognizing that 
an argument existed that the note was not a negotiable instrument within the meaning of the UCC).  See 
also generally JOHN A. SEBERT, DRAFT REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, UCC RULES APPLICABLE TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE NOTES 
AND TO THE OWNERSHIP AND ENFORCEMENT OF THOSE NOTES AND THE MORTGAGES SECURING THEM 
(2011) (suggesting that a mortgage note may be either negotiable or non-negotiable within the meaning 
of the UCC); Letter from Adam J. Levitin et al. to the Permanent Editorial Bd. of the UCC (May 27, 
2011), available at https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/levitin/documents/LawProfessors 
UCCPEBLetter.pdf (arguing that the UCC largely does not apply to the enforcement of mortgage notes, 
where enforcement is primarily realized through mortgage foreclosure which in significant part is 
beyond the purview of the UCC).   
 136. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Foreclosures” (“the Act”).137  The Act was passed in June 2009 as emergency 
legislation to be effective immediately, justified as such by the “unprecedented 
levels” of foreclosures expected to continue at high levels, the “decline in the 
State’s housing market,” loss in property values, the resulting decline in tax 
revenues, and the burden this foreclosure load was placing on the courts.138  The 
Act provided for the creation of a foreclosure mediation program to be 
administered by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and initiated statewide on 
January 1, 2010.139  Subsequently, the Supreme Judicial Court adopted Maine Rule 
of Civil Procedure 93 to govern the Court’s Foreclosure Diversion Program 
(“FDP”), as authorized by the Act.140  The Court also amended Rule 56 to require 
completion of mediation (absent waiver, good cause, or default of mediation) 
before a foreclosing party can move for summary judgment.141  The FDP applies to 
all foreclosures filed on or after January 1, 2010 against owner-occupied primary 
residents of residential property consisting of four units or less.   
The Act creates heightened notice and production requirements at the initiation 
of the foreclosure action.142  These include the requirement that upon filing the 
complaint, the mortgagee must “certify proof of ownership” of the mortgage note 
and “produce evidence” of the mortgage and mortgage note, including all 
assignments and endorsements of both documents.143  Upon initiation of the 
foreclosure action, the mortgagee must also provide the homeowner with 
information as to the homeowner’s right to cure the default by full payment of all 
amounts due without acceleration; an itemized list of all amounts due and 
additional charges; and the contact information for the persons having authority to 
modify the loan.144  The foreclosure complaint sent to the homeowner must also 
include both a brief description of the mediation program and a one-page form 
answer informing the homeowner that failure to answer the complaint will result in 
foreclosure.145  The defendant to the foreclosure action may complete the answer 
form as the only necessary answer to preserve all defenses to the complaint.146 
The Act also creates the mediation program, which is triggered by the 
homeowner’s response to the foreclosure complaint, thus making mediation 
                                                                                                                 
 137. P.L. 2009, ch. 402 (emergency, effective June 15, 2009).  This Comment focuses on those 
portions of the Act which are codified within title 14, chapter 713 of the Maine Revised Statutes. 
 138. Id. pmbl. 
 139. See id. § 24.  
 140. See ME. R. CIV. P. 93 (effective Jan. 1, 2010). 
 141. See ME. R. CIV. P. 56(j). 
 142. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, §§ 6111(1-A), 6321 (2011). 
 143. Id. § 6321. 
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 145. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(2). 
 146. See id. 
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mandatory for both parties.147  Mediation requires that the defendant provide 
financial information to the mortgagee prior to the mediation session to facilitate 
modification or some other foreclosure-avoidance solution to the default, and the 
parties may be required by the mediator to exchange further information in 
anticipation of the mediation.148  Generally, mediation must be completed no more 
than ninety days after the scheduling order is sent to the parties.149  Mediation 
“shall address all issues of foreclosure,” including, ownership of the mortgage and 
note, calculation of sums due, modification of the loan, and restructuring of the 
mortgage debt.150  This process includes completion of a net present value 
worksheet, which is developed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) and included in the FDIC’s Loan Modification Program Guide.151  
Finally, mediation may not operate as a waiver of either party’s rights in the 
foreclosure action.152   
Additionally, Rule 93 specifically requires that the mortgagee’s representative 
at mediation “ha[ve] the authority to agree to a proposed settlement, loan 
modification, or dismissal of the action,” and only allows the mortgagee to appear 
by telephone if the mortgagee’s counsel is authorized to agree to any proposed 
agreement.153  If either party “fails to attend or to make a good faith effort to 
mediate,” the court is authorized to impose “appropriate sanctions.”154  Such 
sanctions may include, but are not limited to 
the assessment of costs and fees, assessment of reasonable attorney fees, entry of 
judgment, permitting dispositive motions and/or requests for admissions to be 
filed, entry of an order that mediation shall not occur, dismissal without prejudice, 
dismissal without prejudice with a prohibition on refiling the foreclosure action for 
a stated period of time, and/or dismissal with prejudice.155   
Upon completion of each mediation session, the mediator must submit a report to 
the court indicating any agreement or points of agreement reached and the results 
of the FDIC worksheet analysis.156  Finally, the mediation program requires some 
confidentiality of certain information revealed during mediation.157 
The Act raises the burden of proof on the foreclosing party before foreclosure 
judgment may be granted by requiring that the mortgagee prove that all elements of 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. § 6321-A(6).   
 148. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(c)(4), (p)(1).   
 149. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(e).   
 150. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(g).   
 151. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(n).  The FDIC net present value worksheet served as a prototype, with some 
modifications, for the HAMP net present value worksheet.  Walsh, supra note 107, at 8. 
 152. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(5); ME. R. CIV. P. 93(o). 
 153. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(h).   
 154. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(j).   
 155. Id. 
 156. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(n).   
 157. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(p).  There is some ambiguity as to the application of the confidentiality 
provisions in the Rule, particularly as to the extent to which a mediator’s report is confidential, which is 
not entirely clear based on the language of Rule 93.  However, clarity as to this issue will be crucial 
going forward to ensure consistent enforcement of negotiated agreements memorialized in a mediator’s 
report.   
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the heightened notice rules were “strictly performed.”158  Furthermore, the Act 
requires that the mortgagee provide the street address, if any, of the property 
subject to the foreclosure action and the book and page number in the registry of 
deeds identifying the property in question.159 
C.  Relevant Decisions by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court 
Since the passage of Maine’s new foreclosure law in 2009 the Law Court has 
decided several residential foreclosure cases that are worthy of mention for 
purposes of this Comment.160 
The first of these cases, decided in December 2009, is Deutsche Bank National 
Trust Co. v. Raggiani.161  In that case, Joanna and Vincenzo Raggiani executed a 
promissory note secured by a mortgage in favor of Argent Mortgage in July 
2006.162  Just over a year later, the Raggianis defaulted on the note when they failed 
to make a monthly payment.163  Deutsche Bank then filed a complaint for 
foreclosure and moved for summary judgment, asserting in its statement of material 
facts that it was the holder of the mortgage and promissory note.164  However, this 
assertion was not supported by a record citation, rather only with a citation to 
Deutsche Bank’s “unverified complaint,” while the Raggianis’ contested Deutsche 
Bank’s ownership of both the mortgage and note.165  At a hearing before the 
District Court (Portland, Eggert, J.), Deutsche Bank was allowed to admit into 
evidence, over the Raggianis’ objection, a copy of Argent Mortgage’s assignment 
of the note and mortgage to Deutsche Bank.166  Although the note was not properly 
filed in the summary judgment record, the court considered it and granted summary 
judgment for Deutsche Bank.167   
The Raggianis appealed, and the Law Court vacated the judgment.168  The Law 
Court held that because Deutsche Bank failed to support its factual assertion at 
summary judgment with a proper record citation as required by M.R. Civ. P. 56(h), 
the Bank did not prove it was the owner of the note and mortgage; therefore, it was 
not entitled to summary judgment.169  The Law Court noted that a “court is neither 
required nor permitted to independently search a record to find support for facts 
offered by a party.”170  The Law Court reasoned that “[i]n the unique setting of 
                                                                                                                 
 158. ME. REV. STAT.  tit. 14, §6321 (2011).  
 159. Id. 
 160. The issues presented in these cases do not directly address the mediation program.  However, in 
the context of the FDP, these cases are instructive in understanding the current state of the law regarding 
foreclosure proceedings in Maine. 
 161. 2009 ME 120, 985 A.2d 1.   
 162. Id. ¶ 2.   
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. ¶ 3.   
 165. Id.   
 166. Id. ¶ 4.   
 167. Id.   
 168. Id. ¶ 1.   
 169. Id. ¶ 6. 
 170. Id. ¶ 7 (quoting Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, ¶ 9, 770 A.2d 653).   
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summary judgment, strict adherence to the Rule’s requirements is necessary to 
ensure that the process is both predictable and just.”171 
The same month the Law Court ruled on Raggiani, it also decided Chase 
Home Finance v. Higgins.172  John and Valarie Higgins executed a promissory note 
for $ 250,000 secured by a home mortgage to Wachovia Mortgage Corporation.173  
The terms of the loan required repayment over thirty years with a fixed annual 
interest rate of six percent.174  Chase filed a foreclosure action in 2007, alleging that 
the Higginses defaulted on the modified mortgage agreement, were properly 
notified of their right to cure, and owed Chase $ 286,965.33.175  Chase moved for 
summary judgment, which the Higginses opposed, providing evidence that Chase 
had accelerated the loan before the statutorily required notice of default was 
provided, in violation of title 14, section 6111 of the Maine Revised Statutes.176  
The Higginses also contested the amount owed, providing evidence that suggested 
they had not been fully credited for at least nine payments on the note.177  Chase 
filed a reply memorandum and supporting documents that controverted the 
Higginses’ assertions but did not properly file a reply statement of material fact, 
and thus the memorandum was not considered part of the summary judgment 
record.178  Nevertheless, the Superior Court (York County, Fritzsche, J.) granted 
summary judgment in favor of Chase.179 
The Higginses appealed, and the Law Court vacated and remanded, finding 
that genuine issues of material fact persisted as to whether Chase provided the 
Higginses with proper notice and as to the amount due on the note.180  The Law 
Court noted that summary judgment must not be granted in a residential foreclosure 
action before the mortgage holder provides certain information, including 
the existence of the mortgage . . . ; properly presented proof of ownership of the 
mortgage note and the mortgage, including all assignments . . . ; a breach of 
condition in the mortgage; the amount due on the mortgage, including reasonable 
attorney’s fees . . . ; the order of priority and any amounts that may be due to other 
parties . . . ; evidence of properly served notice of default and mortgagor’s right to 
cure . . . ; . . . proof of completed mediation (or waiver or default of mediation), 
when required . . . ; and, if the homeowner has not appeared in the proceeding, a 
statement . . . of whether or not the [homeowner] is in military service in 
accordance with the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act.181 
Third, in September 2010, the Law Court decided Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. v. Saunders.182  Jon Saunders signed a promissory note 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Id.  
 172. 2009 ME 136, 985 A.2d 508. 
 173. Id. ¶ 2. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. ¶ 4. 
 176. Id. ¶ 7. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. ¶ 8. 
 179. Id. ¶ 1. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. ¶ 11 (citations omitted).  To establish the list of required information, the Law Court relied 
on many of the sources that have been discussed in this Part.  See id. 
 182. 2010 ME 79, 2 A.3d 289. 
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in benefit of Accredited Home Lenders, Inc. in June 2006.183  The accompanying 
mortgage instrument signed by Jon and Belinda Saunders secured the promissory 
note and named MERS as “nominee” for Accredited and all “successors and 
assigns.”184  Less than three years after taking the mortgage registered to MERS, 
the Saunderses failed to make payments on the note, and MERS filed a foreclosure 
complaint on February 4, 2009.185  MERS moved for summary judgment on May 
27, 2009, claiming it was the “holder” of both the mortgage and the note without 
identifying whether any real property actually secured the note.186  The Saunderses 
maintained that MERS held neither the mortgage nor the note and produced 
MERS’s admissions, pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 36, that Deutsche 
Bank was the actual note holder.187  The parties further disputed whether Deutsche 
Bank gave the Saunderses effective notice of the foreclosure proceedings and 
whether the Saunderses were actually in default on the note.188   
On September 9, 2009, the District Court denied MERS’s motion for summary 
judgment without detailing what genuine issues of material fact persisted.189  The 
next day, Deutsche Bank moved, pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c), 
to substitute itself for MERS where the Bank was not yet a party to the action.190  
Approximately one week later and before the District Court had ruled on the 
substitution motion, Deutsche Bank moved to reconsider or amend the order 
denying summary judgment for MERS pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 
59(e) and made a motion for further findings pursuant Rule 52(b).191  In support of 
these motions, Deutsche Bank filed a document showing that on July 8, 2009, 
Accredited transferred the promissory note to Deutsche Bank and that MERS had 
transferred to Deutsche Bank any interest it had in the note and mortgage.192  The 
Saunderses contested both motions and filed their own cross-motion for summary 
judgment, claiming that neither party could show that MERS held the note when 
the complaint was originally filed.193  The District Court entered judgment for 
Deutsche Bank on December 16, 2009, allowing Deutsche Bank’s substitution for 
MERS, and simultaneously granting summary judgment to Deutsche Bank.194   
                                                                                                                 
 183. Id. ¶ 3.  Accredited Home Lenders is listed in Maine as a California corporation.  Corporate 
Name Search, ME. DEP’T OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, https://icrs.informe.org/nei-sos-
icrs/ICRS?CorpSumm=19980038+F (last visited Sept. 23, 2011).  Accredited’s corporate authority in 
Maine was revoked on September 28, 2009 after it failed to file its annual report.  Id. (click on “View 
list of filings”).  Accredited filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on May 1, 2009 and former clients may call 
a phone number to get more information regarding their Accredited issued loans.  See Accredited Home 
Lenders Holding Co., KURTZMAN CARSON CONSULTANTS, http://www.kccllc.net/accredited (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2011). 
 184. Saunders, 2010 ME 79, ¶ 3, 2 A.3d 289. 
 185. Id. ¶ 4.  
 186. Id. 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. ¶ 5. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. ¶ 6. 
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The Saunderses appealed, arguing that (1) as a non-stakeholder, MERS did not 
have standing to sue, (2) substitution of parties could not be used to cure the 
jurisdictional defect, and (3) Deutsche Bank was not entitled to summary 
judgment.195   
Examining the question of MERS’s standing, the Law Court found that the 
relationship of MERS to the Saunderses’ transaction was somewhat unclear.196  
The Court noted that the mortgage document simultaneously defined MERS as 
both a “nominee” and a “mortgagee.”197  The Law Court found that 
[Deutsche] Bank admitted in its statement of material facts that Accredited had 
never assigned, transferred, or endorsed the note executed by Jon Saunders to 
MERS, and represented that Accredited had transferred the note directly to 
[Deutsche] Bank.  Without possession of or any interest in the note, MERS lacked 
standing to institute foreclosure proceedings and could not invoke the jurisdiction 
of our trial courts.198   
Furthermore, the Law Court held that Accredited was the real party in interest at 
the time MERS initiated the action199 because Accredited was both the mortgagee 
and the holder of the note, whereas MERS merely held the right to record the 
mortgage.200 
However, the Law Court found that substitution was not an abuse of the 
District Court’s discretion where the Law Court had not previously spoken on the 
issue of MERS standing in foreclosure, and the complaint filed in MERS’s name 
rather than the lender’s name was an “understandable mistake” within the meaning 
of the Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) substitution provision and the Court’s 
holding in Tisdale v. Rawson.201  Finally, the Court held that the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment because “the Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
allow for reconsideration or amendment in the absence of a final judgment,” and 
because the foreclosing parties’ amended motion did not support a judgment as a 
matter of law for Deutsche Bank.202  Thus, the Law Court remanded the case for 
further proceedings.203 
Fourth, in January 2011, the Law Court decided JPMorgan Chase Bank v. 
Harp.204  JPMorgan Chase filed a foreclosure complaint against Brian Harp in 
March 2009 alleging that Harp was in default.205  However, the record established 
that JPMorgan Chase was not assigned the mortgage until April 16, 2009 and that 
the assignment was not recorded until May 28, 2009.206  Nevertheless, the District 
                                                                                                                 
 195. Id. ¶ 1. 
 196. Id. ¶ 8. 
 197. See id. ¶ 9. 
 198. Id. ¶ 15. 
 199. Id. ¶ 19. 
 200. Id. ¶ 11 n.3.  
 201. Id. ¶ 19 (citing Tisdale v. Rawson, 2003 ME 68, ¶ 19, 822 A.2d 1136).   
 202. Id. ¶ 26. 
 203. Id.  
 204. 2011 ME 5, 10 A.3d 718.   
 205. Id. ¶¶ 2-3.   
 206. Id. ¶ 3.  Indeed, JPMorgan never affirmatively brought the fact of its subsequent acquisition of 
the mortgage to the court’s attention.  Id. ¶ 10 n.4. 
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Court (Ellsworth, Staples, J.) granted JPMorgan Chase’s motion for summary 
judgment.207   
Harp appealed, arguing that because the bank did not hold the mortgage at the 
time the action was commenced, it lacked standing to bring the action.208  The Law 
Court affirmed summary judgment for JPMorgan Chase,209 reasoning that although 
JPMorgan Chase “improperly filed the foreclosure complaint” before owning the 
mortgage, “this defect was cured” when the mortgage was assigned to JPMorgan 
Chase.210  Thus, because Harp did not raise this issue until after the assignment and 
JPMorgan Chase properly held the mortgage before moving for summary 
judgment, the court below did not err in granting JPMorgan Chase’s motion.211  
The Court concluded that JPMorgan Chase’s premature filing was an 
“understandable mistake” within the meaning of Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 
17(a), and that although substitution might be available in this case, it was not 
“appropriate or necessary.”212  The Law Court was careful to note that this case 
appeared before it in a “new and uncharted posture” and, therefore, cautioned 
against relying on substitution to avoid strict standing requirements.213  The Court 
also observed that although the District Court granted summary judgment before 
the enactment of the FDP, going forward the mediation program would protect 
homeowners and require “careful scrutiny for compliance with all procedural 
prerequisites at the outset of litigation.”214 
Harp further argued that JPMorgan did not provide him with proper notice of 
default and that the servicer had instructed him not to make payments while a loan 
modification was being negotiated.215  The Law Court, however, dismissed the 
notice argument, finding that Harp had failed to sufficiently meet his burden to 
prove the applicability of this affirmative defense.216  As to the arguments 
regarding the modification, the Court found no record evidence to support Harp’s 
contentions.217  Significantly, Harp appeared before the Court as a pro se litigant,218 
and in its conclusion the Law Court noted the fact that JPMorgan’s motion for 
summary judgment was “effectively unopposed” as support for its flexible 
application of the standing requirements.219   
These cases demonstrate the Law Court’s careful scrutiny of summary 
judgment motions by foreclosing parties, particularly when effectively opposed by 
counsel, as evidenced by the fact that in three out of the four cases the Law Court 
vacated lower court judgments in favor of the foreclosing party based on persisting 
issues of fact.  Furthermore, the Court’s decision in Saunders effectively precludes 
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MERS from acting as the plaintiff to initiate foreclosure actions insofar as MERS 
acts as merely a nominee to the mortgagee.  Finally, in both Saunders and Harp, 
the Law Court demonstrates a somewhat flexible approach to substitution, although 
the Court in Harp appears to condition this flexibility on the facts of the case and 
discourages future parties from relying on substitution to avoid the strict standing 
requirements in foreclosure cases. 
IV.  MAXIMIZING FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY?  MEDIATION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
AND THE “GOOD FAITH” REQUIREMENT 
A.  The Results of the Mediation Program 
Prior to implementing the FDP, the Maine Judicial Commission on 
Foreclosure Diversion identified the goal of promoting “prompt and fair 
resolutions” to foreclosure proceedings.220  In a report to the Maine Legislature 
submitted after one year of operation of the FDP, the Judicial Branch noted that 
2010 saw 5,409 new foreclosure filings,221 of which the courts conducted 
mediation in 983 cases and a total of 1,243 mediations when including cases 
involving multiple mediation sessions.222  The courts conducted these mediation 
sessions between April and December 2010,223 resulting in 505 final reports filed 
upon completion of the mediation.224  From those 505 final reports, one can begin 
to ascertain the initial results of the mediation program.  Mediation was concluded 
most often—over fifty percent of the time—because the parties could not reach an 
agreement.225  About twenty-one percent of the final reports indicated that the 
parties reached some sort of agreement.226  Slightly more than twenty percent, or 
the remaining cases, concluded because the homeowner failed to attend the 
mediation sessions.227  Thus, the report reveals that the mediation program has 
obtained a twenty-one percent success rate in its first year of operation.228  Of the 
1243 mediations, the remaining 738 that did not produce final reports resulted in 
interim reports.229  The two most common reasons for issuing an interim rather than 
a final report were either “because the parties wanted to exchange additional 
information or because the parties entered into a loan modification with a 
[successfully run] trial period . . . before the [mortgagee] would agree to dismiss 
the [foreclosure] action.”230   
                                                                                                                 
 220. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 9.  These goals conform to Maine Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1 (“[The Rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action.”).   
 221. 2011 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 21, at 2.   
 222. Id. at 4. 
 223. Telephone Interview with Lauren Blake Weliver, Manager, Foreclosure Diversion Program 
(Aug. 16, 2011) (notes on file with author).   
 224. 2011 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 21, at 4. 
 225. Id. (207 out of 505 mediations where a final report was submitted). 
 226. Id. (107 out of 505 mediations where a final report was submitted). 
 227. Id. (121 out of 505 mediations where a final report was submitted). 
 228. Id.    
 229. Id.   
 230. Id.    
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However, the report reveals that even where agreements are reached, these 
agreements often take “months of negotiation by the parties” and thus the true 
impact of the mediation program will not be evident until more cases move through 
the mediation process and finally off the court’s docket.231  Of the ninety-eight 
cases that resulted in dismissal because of mediation in 2010, sixty-two involved 
modification agreements.232  The remaining dismissals were a result of one of the 
following: repayment and forbearance plans; deeds in lieu of foreclosure; short 
sales; mortgage reinstatements; homeowner sales; or, cash for keys agreements.233  
It is worth noting that four dismissals were the result of the court’s sanction against 
the lender.234  Unfortunately, the FDP does not have the ability to track successful 
mediations upon dismissal of the case, and thus it will be difficult to gauge the 
extent to which mediated modifications provide lasting solutions for the parties 
involved.235  
In sum, in its first year of operation, the mediation program achieved 
significant success in assisting homeowners and lenders to avoid foreclosure 
through negotiated resolutions to default.  However, it is also apparent that the 
majority of mediation sessions do not result in a negotiated resolution while delays 
during mediation and a lack of permanency of negotiated agreements have proven 
to be significant challenges to the program’s stated goals of maximizing fairness 
and efficiency.  Any adjustments to the program going forward must take these 
factors into account while improving upon the overall successes of the program in 
its first year. 
B.  The Ongoing Challenges to Effective Foreclosure Diversion: Summary 
Judgment Shortcomings and Pro Se Defendants 
In addition to certain difficulties in achieving efficient and permanent 
resolutions at the mediation phase of the foreclosure dispute, it is worth considering 
two additional factors that have contributed to hindering the mediation program’s 
success.  The first is revealed at the summary judgment stage of litigation.  Indeed, 
as in Raggiani, Higgins, and Saunders, a series of recent Maine lower court cases 
reveal regular delays and challenges to fairness when the foreclosing party moves 
for summary judgment yet fails to meet its burden of proof to warrant foregoing 
                                                                                                                 
 231. Id. at 5.  
 232. Id.    
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 234. Id.    
 235. Id.  Although tracking the success of a negotiated agreement following dismissal from 
mediation is clearly beyond the immediate jurisdiction of the District Courts, the ultimate success of the 
mediation program depends upon whether the agreements negotiated in mediation prove to be long-term 
solutions rather than merely temporary foreclosure avoidance mechanisms.  Thus, while it is 
understandable that long-term tracking of negotiated solutions has proven beyond the scope of the 
FDP’s data collection capabilities, any evaluation of the ultimate success of the program depends on 
some analysis of the lasting effects of mediation.  Therefore, the FDP and the Legislature should 
consider creating some means for obtaining this data, even if only from a representative sample of 
mediation participants.   
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further proceedings.236  An examination of these cases reveals that the defendants’ 
attorneys repeatedly raised genuine issues of material fact, leading the lower courts 
to subsequently deny the foreclosing party’s motion for summary judgment.237  
Presiding judges in these cases found genuine issues of material fact as to whether 
(1) the moving party was actually the owner of the note,238 (2) the defendant was 
actually in default,239 (3) the foreclosing party provided the homeowner with proper 
notice of default,240 (4) the defendant in default had a meaningful opportunity to 
                                                                                                                 
 236. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.  Although most of these cases were filed prior to 
the initiation of the mediation program, the results at summary judgment nonetheless prove instructive 
going forward.   
 237. See infra notes 243-46 and accompanying text. 
 238. See CIT Grp./Consumer Fin. v. Bernier, 2008 Me. Super. LEXIS 166 (July 29, 2008); SunTrust 
Mortg., Inc. v. Humes, No. RE-08-196 (Me. Dist. Ct., West Bath, Jan. 6, 2010) (Field, J.); HSBC Bank 
USA, Nat’l Ass’n v. Davis, No. RE-09-098 (Me. Dist. Ct., West Bath, Mar. 19, 2010) (Field, J.); BAC 
Home Loans Servicing LP v. Weymouth, No. RE-09-015 (Me. Dist. Ct., Augusta, Dec. 12, 2009) 
(Mulhern, J.); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Jaenisch, No. RE-09-23 (Me. Dist. Ct., Dover-Foxcroft, July 31, 
2009) (Stitham, J.) (denying summary judgment for the foreclosing party where it failed to establish 
valid assignment of the note to the Bank, valid possession of the note, and the appropriate amount of 
interest due on the note); Wells Fargo Bank v. Clark, No. RE-08-295 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, June 9, 
2009) (Douglas, J.) (holding that the foreclosing party was not a party in interest and lacked standing 
where it was assigned the mortgage and note four days after it filed the foreclosure action); U.S. Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n v. Hartman, No. RE-08-026 (Me. Dist. Ct., Augusta, May 11, 2009) (Mulhern, J.) (denying 
summary judgment to the foreclosing party where it failed to provide the defendant with an indorsed 
copy of the promissory note as requested by defendant in discovery, thus raising a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the validity of the endorsement); Aurora Loan Servs. LLC v. Simpson, No. RE-08-
127 (Me. Dist. Ct., Wiscasset, Apr. 16, 2009) (Hjelm, J.); LaSalle Bank v. Frye, No. RE-08-41 (Me. 
Dist. Ct., South Paris, Jan. 14, 2009) (Cote, J.) (finding that the Bank had not satisfactorily established it 
was the holder of the promissory note as of the date of filing, thus precluding summary judgment); 
CountryWide Home Loans, Inc. v. D’Amico, No. RE-07-204 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Dec. 3, 2008) 
(O’Neil, J.); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Mosher, No. RE-08-10 (Me. Dist. Ct., Farmington, May 6, 2008) 
(Stanfill, J.) (finding there was an issue of material fact as to whether PHH had any interest in the note it 
sought to enforce where it was assigned the mortgage but the record did not support a finding that it held 
the note); Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Philbrick, No. RE-07-70 (Me. Dist. Ct., Farmington, 
Jan. 28, 2008) (Stanfill, J.) (finding that while the record supported a finding that the mortgage was 
assigned to Deutsche Bank, there was no evidence on the record that the promissory note was ever 
assigned to the Bank).   
 239. See Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown, No. RE-2008-258 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., Feb. 12, 
2009) (Warren, J.); Simpson, No. RE-08-127; D’Amico, No. RE-07-204.  In Brown, the court found that 
Quicken’s attached affidavit in support of its motion for summary judgment, which alleged defendant 
Brown was in default, was not based on personal knowledge and not supported by any attached business 
record; thus, the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay under Maine Rule of Evidence 803(6), and summary 
judgment was precluded under Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).  Brown, RE-08-258, at 3.  
 240. See Camden Nat’l Bank v. Soule, 2010 Me. Super. LEXIS 39 (Apr. 8, 2010); Davis, No. RE-09-
098; Humes, No. RE-08-196 (holding that the foreclosing party provided defective notice of default 
where it did not adhere to the mortgage agreement’s requirements for foreclosure).  In Soule, the 
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Wheeler, J.) rejected a mortgagee’s motion for summary judgment 
on its foreclosure action finding that the moving party had failed to include information in its statement 
of material facts that the “notice requirement [was] strictly complied with or a statement as to whether 
or not the Defendants are in military service as required by the Servicemember’s Civil Relief Act.”  
Soule, 2010 Me. Super. LEXIS 39, at *4.  The Servicemember’s Civil Relief Act provides heightened 
protection from default judgment for military service members, including requiring the moving party to 
file an affidavit as to whether the defendant who has failed to appear is a military service member before 
granting summary judgment for the plaintiff.  See 50 U.S.C.A. Appx. § 521 (West 2010).  The Court 
found a deficiency in the notice requirement existed at summary judgment despite the fact that the 
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cure default;241 and (5) the foreclosing party properly established the amount due 
on the promissory note.242 
Of the fifteen lower court orders denying summary judgment examined in this 
Comment, twelve denied summary judgment based on the moving party’s failure to 
satisfactorily prove it was the owner of the note at the time it filed the foreclosure 
complaint.243  Generally, the lower court’s reasoning in denying summary 
judgment in these cases rested on four different factual scenarios: (1) a failure to 
properly record an assignment;244 (2) the foreclosing party had proven it received 
                                                                                                                 
foreclosing party attached an affidavit to the statement of material facts evidencing notice.  Soule, 2010 
Me. Super. LEXIS 39, at *4-5 n.4.  However, where the foreclosing party had failed to cite the 
information from this affidavit in its statement of material fact, the Court found that this affidavit was 
“not properly before the court,” and cited Chase Home Finance v. Higgins as supporting precedent.  Id.  
In Higgins, the Law Court found that summary judgment was precluded even though “[a]n affidavit 
referred to in [the Plaintiff’s] statement of material facts did state the amount owed on the mortgage note 
[but] the amount was not stated in the statement of material facts itself.”  Chase Home Fin. LLC v. 
Higgins, 2009 ME 136, ¶ 12 n.4, 985 A.2d 508. 
 241. See Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Taggert, 2009 Me. Super. LEXIS 105 (July 20, 2009).  The 
Superior Court (Cumberland County, Cole, J.) denied summary judgment where an issue of material 
fact remained as to whether the lender had provided the homeowner with a “meaningful opportunity” to 
cure the default as required by the mortgage agreement.  Id. at *9.  The homeowner, Connie Taggert, 
had executed a promissory note and mortgage in 2005 to MERS as nominee for the lender.  Id. at *1.  
MERS subsequently assigned the note to the Bank of New York, whose servicer sent Taggert a default 
notice in October 2008, advising Taggert that $ 11,888.92 was due on the mortgage and that further fees 
could accrue immediately.  Id. at *2-3.  That same month, Taggert and another defendant party in 
interest (collectively “Taggert”) interacted with the Bank in attempting to cure the default.  Id. at *3.  
Taggert had a check sent to the Bank in the full amount due according to the notice, but the Bank 
returned the check a few days later claiming it failed to cure the default because the payment was not 
equal to the full amount due at the time of receipt of the check.  Id.  While the letter did not reveal the 
full amount due to cure the default, it advised Taggert to contact the attorney assigned to her loan.  Id. at 
*4.  However, the Superior Court record reveals that prior to sending the check to the Bank, Taggert had 
attempted to contact the Bank’s servicer or the servicer’s attorney five different times in less than a 
month to ascertain the full amount needed to cure the default.  Id. at *4 n.2.  Taggert claimed that, 
despite these attempts, she was never provided information as to what she actually owed and alleged the 
servicer or servicer’s attorney told her on different occasions that this information was “not available”; 
that her file did not appear on the attorney’s computer; and even that the firm was “way behind” in 
calculating the full amount due and therefore was unable to help her.  Id. at *7 n.4.  The court reasoned 
that while Taggert was incorrect in arguing that she was not in default based on the attempted payment 
that the servicer returned where that payment didn’t represent the full amount due, Taggert had 
generated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she had been afforded an adequate opportunity 
to cure the default as provided by the mortgage agreement, and therefore, the Bank was precluded from 
summary judgment.  Id. at *9.     
 242. Jaenisch, No. RE-09-23, at 3.   
 243. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
 244. See, e.g., CIT Grp./Consumer Fin. v. Bernier, 2008 Me. Super. LEXIS 166, at *3 (July 29, 
2008).  The Superior Court (Cumberland County, Cole, J.) denied summary judgment for CIT Group, 
the alleged mortgagee and foreclosing party, where CIT failed to provide any documentation proving it 
was in fact the owner of the loan despite the fact that the homeowner “failed to properly oppose” the 
summary judgment motion.  Id. at *3-4.  The defendants, Joseph and Ivy Bernier, had executed a 
promissory note secured by a mortgage to MERS in 2007.  Id. at *1.  The Berniers simultaneously 
executed a quit claim deed to Amanda Bernier, yet less than three months later, the Berniers were in 
default on the loan.  Id.  Six months after default, CIT allegedly sent a notice to cure default to the 
Berniers and subsequently moved for foreclosure.  Id. at *1-2.  In denying summary judgment, the 
Superior Court noted that CIT had conceded that at the time it filed for summary judgment, it had not 
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an assignment of the mortgage, but not the note;245 (3) the foreclosure action was 
initiated by a party who was only assigned the note after the action commenced;246 
                                                                                                                 
yet recorded an assignment of the note, and the court rejected CIT’s attempt to cure this defect by filing 
an assignment of the mortgage after moving for summary judgment.  Id. at *3.  The court cited the Law 
Court’s holding in Camden National Bank v. Peterson for the proposition that the court, in making a 
summary judgment determination, is “neither required nor permitted” to search the record outside the 
summary judgment filings for facts supporting the parties’ motions.  Id. at *4 (citing Camden Nat’l 
Bank v. Peterson, 2008 ME 85, ¶ 26, 948 A.2d 1251).  See also ME. R. CIV. P. 56(h)(4) (“The court 
shall have no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in 
the parties’ separate statement of facts.”).  Interestingly, Justice Cole, presiding in Bernier, had faced a 
somewhat similar issue in Taggert, where the moving party, Bank of New York, filed a foreclosure 
complaint one week before receiving an assignment of the mortgage from MERS, yet the court declined 
to consider the defendant’s argument that the Bank lacked standing at the time the complaint was filed.  
Taggert, 2009 Me. Super. LEXIS 105, at *2 n.1.  Rather, the court stated that it was “satisfied that 
[Bank of New York] will receive a corrective assignment” and thus rejected the standing argument.  Id. 
 245. See, e.g., BAC Home Loans Servicing LP v. Weymouth, No. RE-09-015, at 2 (Me. Dist. Ct., 
Augusta, Dec. 12, 2009) (Mulhern, J.).  See also Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Philbrick, No. 
RE-07-70 (Me. Dist. Ct., Farmington, Jan. 28, 2008) (Stanfill, J.).  In Weymouth, the District Court 
(Augusta, Mulhern, J.) denied summary judgment to BAC where BAC failed to prove it was the valid 
assignee of the underlying promissory note.  Weymouth, No. RE-09-015, at 1.  Defendant Celisa 
Weymouth executed a promissory note to American Residential Mortgage (“ARM”) and signed the 
underlying mortgage over to MERS as ARM’s nominee.  Id.  MERS subsequently assigned the 
mortgage to CountryWide Home Loans Servicing, which then assigned the note to BAC.  Id. at 1-2.  
When Weymouth defaulted on her mortgage and BAC brought the foreclosure action seeking summary 
judgment, the court noted “an assignment of the mortgage by MERS is not an assignment of the note.”  
Id. at 2.  Thus, the court found BAC had not made any showing that MERS ever had any interest in the 
note to suggest the assignment of the mortgage to BAC included assignment of the note, and therefore, 
BAC was precluded from summary judgment.  Id. (citing Wyman v. Porter, 108 Me. 110, 115, 79 A. 
371, 373 (1911), and Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271, 274 (1872), in support of the view 
that an assignment of a mortgage alone without the promissory note is a “nullity.”).  See supra note 128.  
Interestingly, the court also cited a New York decision in support of the proposition that “MERS does 
not have the authority, in its capacity as ‘nominee’ for the lender on a Mortgage, to assign the note to a 
third party.”  Weymouth, No. RE-09-015, at 2 (citing LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d 
769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Aug. 7, 2006)).   
 246. See, e.g., HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n v. Davis, No. RE-09-098, at 7 (Me. Dist. Ct., West 
Bath, Mar. 19, 2010) (Field, J.); Wells Fargo Bank v. Clark, No. RE-08-295, at 2-3 (Me. Dist. Ct., 
Biddeford, June 9, 2009) (Douglas, J.).  See also SunTrust Mortg., Inc. v. Humes, No. RE-08-196 (Me. 
Dist. Ct., West Bath, Jan. 6, 2010) (Field, J.); LaSalle Bank v. Frye, No. RE-08-41 (Me. Dist. Ct., South 
Paris, Jan. 14, 2009) (Cote, J.).  In Davis, the District Court (West Bath, Field, J.) denied summary 
judgment for the foreclosing party HSBC Bank and further held HSBC did not have standing to sue 
where it was not assigned the promissory note or mortgage until after filing the complaint for 
foreclosure.  Davis, No. RE-09-098, at 7.  Defendants Richard and June Davis executed a promissory 
note to Accredited Home Lenders in November 2004, secured by a mortgage granted to MERS as 
nominee to Accredited.  Id. at 1. The Davises subsequently defaulted in January 2009.  Id.  Chase Home 
Finance notified the Davises of default the following month.  Id.  HSBC filed a foreclosure action on 
June 4, 2009.  Id.  Five days later MERS assigned its “interest” in the Davis mortgage and note to 
HSBC.  Id.  HSBC then moved for summary judgment.  Id. at 2.  In denying summary judgment and 
dismissing the case, the court refused to “assume physical possession of the original [n]ote and 
[m]ortgage merely because copies of those instruments were attached to the [c]omplaint.”  Id. at 4.  The 
court further ruled that the servicer Chase Home Finance provided defective notice of default to the 
Davises, where the mortgage instrument required the “lender,” not the servicer, to deliver the notice of 
default.  Id. at 7.  Finally, the court held that even if the lender had properly delivered the notice, it 
would still have been defective because it failed to properly inform the Davises of their rights, including 
their right to cure.  Id.   
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and (4) a failure to properly support an assertion of ownership of the note.247  All 
contested at summary judgment, these cases illustrate the lower courts’ strict 
scrutiny of the moving parties’ claims at summary judgment in foreclosure 
proceedings, mirroring the Law Court’s decisions supporting this approach.  These 
cases also illustrate repeated failures by the foreclosing parties to efficiently adapt 
their business practices to the relevant state law requirements for foreclosure 
actions.  These inefficiencies are further exemplified by several cases imposing 
sanctions on the foreclosing party at mediation.248   
The second challenge to achieving the FDP’s goals of fairness and efficiency, 
specifically that of fairness, is revealed by the 2011 Judicial Branch Report to the 
Maine Legislature, which indicates that although the foreclosing party is typically 
represented at all stages of the foreclosure proceeding, only thirty-nine percent of 
homeowners had legal representation at mediation.249  However, prior to the 
mediation program, estimates indicate that less than ten percent of all homeowners 
facing foreclosure enjoyed representation by counsel.250  Furthermore, prior to 
implementation of the mediation program, the mortgagor did not contest seventy 
                                                                                                                 
 247. See, e.g., Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Cormiea, No. RE-10-259 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Mar. 8, 
2011) (dismissing a foreclosure action without prejudice where the foreclosing party failed to comply 
with the title 14, section § 6321 of the Maine Revised Statutes requirements that the foreclosing party 
attach certain documents to the complaint, including proof of possession of the note and mortgage and 
evidence of compliance with the statutory notice requirements).  See also Jaenisch, No. RE-09-23; U.S. 
Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Hartman, No. RE-08-026 (Me. Dist. Ct., Augusta, May 11, 2009) (Mulhern, J.); 
Aurora Loan Servs. LLC v. Simpson, No. RE-08-127 (Me. Dist. Ct., Wiscasset, Apr. 16, 2009) (Hjelm, 
J.); CountryWide Home Loans, Inc. v. D’Amico, No. RE-07-204 (Me. Dist. Ct., Biddeford, Dec. 3, 
2008) (O’Neil, J.); PHH Mortg. Corp. v. Mosher, No. RE-08-10 (Me. Dist. Ct., Farmington, May 6, 
2008).  In D’Amico, the District Court (Biddeford, O’Neil, J.) denied foreclosing party CountryWide 
Home Loans’ motion for summary judgment where it failed to adequately prove it was the holder of the 
promissory note or that the defendant was in default on the note.  D’Amico, No. RE-07-204, at 2.  The 
court noted that CountryWide had only submitted a sworn affidavit with attached proof of assignment of 
the note to prove it was in fact the holder of the note, but the mortgage indicated its holder was another 
company.  Id.  The court, therefore, held that CountryWide “cannot demand payment on a note it does 
not hold.”  Id.  Although CountryWide attempted to correct this problem by mailing a different version 
of the promissory note to the court and asking the court to attach this document to the affidavit, the court 
refused to attach the second version of the note, finding this would “destroy the integrity of a sworn 
affidavit by illegally attaching a different document to it than was sworn to by the affiant.”  Id.  The 
court further found that CountryWide failed to properly prove the defendant was in default where its 
sworn affidavit alleged default but was not supported by any business record proving default.  Id.  Thus, 
the court found that the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay under Maine Rule of Evidence 803(6) and 
therefore could not be considered for purposes of summary judgment under Maine Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(e).  Id.  Rule 56(e) states that “affidavits . . . shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence.” 
 248. See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. v. Richardson, 2011 ME 38, ¶¶ 1, 5, 15 A.3d 756 (imposing sanctions 
where the foreclosing party’s representative repeatedly failed to attend scheduled mediation sessions and 
failed to offer a credible justification).  See also CitiMortgage v. Dente, No. RE-10-215 (Me. Dist. Ct., 
Biddeford, May 20, 2011) (Cantara, J.) (imposing sanctions where the foreclosing party failed to present 
requested forms at mediation and where the foreclosing party was not forthcoming regarding whether 
the homeowner qualified for HAMP or other modifications).   
 249. 2011 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 21, at 3.  Forty-nine percent of homeowners participating in 
mediation received some help in filling out the financial forms and worksheets required at mediation.  
Id.   
 250. Foreclosed Justice, supra note 8, at 294. 
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percent of foreclosure actions, generally resulting in summary judgment.251  This 
trend appears to have largely continued despite mediation.252  In sum, although 
mediation has provided solutions for a minority of parties, it appears that 
foreclosure actions in Maine continue to be dominated by unrepresented litigants, 
unanswered complaints, and uncontested summary judgment orders for the 
mortgagee. 
The low incidence of legal representation for defaulting parties in foreclosure 
actions may carry some relation to the foreclosing parties’ consistent failure to 
prove a beneficiary interest in the note in cases where summary judgment is 
contested.  Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 56(h)(4) requires that the court in 
uncontested cases admit the foreclosing party’s statement of material fact if 
supported by proper record citations,253 a lesson pro se litigant Brian Harp learned 
the hard way in JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp, where Harp failed to timely 
contest the late assignment of the mortgage to JPMorgan.254  Thus, as Harp 
demonstrates, uncontested foreclosure actions result in less scrutiny of the 
foreclosing party’s assertions and record citations, allowing the foreclosing party to 
win on summary judgment without its assertions and the underlying record proof of 
these assertions being fully tested by the adversary system.   
Because uncontested foreclosure actions are not fully tested by the adversary 
process, there is no way to know with empirical certainty whether, if contested, 
uncontested foreclosure actions would suffer from the same sorts of failures of 
proof as evident in contested cases.255  However, anecdotal evidence and inference 
strongly suggest that similar documentation problems may often exist in 
uncontested cases.  For example, in testimony before the House Judiciary 
Committee, Volunteer Lawyers Project attorney Thomas Cox stated that in his 
extensive experience with foreclosure summary judgment motions handled by 
PTLA and MASH,256 foreclosure defense attorneys prevailed approximately 
seventy-five percent of the time in blocking summary judgment for the foreclosing 
party.257  Likewise, the nationwide incidence of reliance on faulty lender affidavits 
                                                                                                                 
 251. 2009 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 17, at 18. 
 252. In 2010, there were 5,409 new foreclosure filings.  2011 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 21, at 2.  
Given that mediation was only conducted in 983 cases and that mediation is triggered merely by filling 
out and returning the one-page answer form provided to the mortgagor by the foreclosing party when 
notice of the foreclosure complaint is filed, it would appear that most mortgagors fail to respond to the 
complaint, suggesting that most foreclosure actions continue to go uncontested.. 
 253. ME. R. CIV. P. 56(h)(4) (stating  “[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of 
material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless 
properly controverted.  An assertion of fact set forth in a statement of material facts shall be followed by 
a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion.  The 
court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly 
considered on summary judgment.”). 
 254. See 2011 ME 5, ¶ 19, 10 A.3d 718; see also supra, Part III.C. 
 255. Additionally, if no discovery is ever performed in uncontested summary judgment motions, 
defendants never develop records that to rebut moving parties’ statements of material fact. 
 256. MASH is a group of approximately sixty attorneys in Maine dedicated to providing Maine 
homeowners with pro bono legal assistance.  Foreclosed Justice, supra note 8, at 293.   
 257. Id. at 294.  While screening may in part explain this high success rate, it is not unreasonable to 
surmise that these successful oppositions to summary judgment indicate the likely unsoundness of a 
significant percentage of uncontested summary judgment motions.  
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revealed in Bradbury provides further evidence of the widespread unsoundness of 
at least one necessary element (the lender affidavit) for summary judgment in many 
states, including Maine.258 
Thus, the combination of a high incidence of pro se foreclosure defendants and 
the foreclosing parties’ repeated failures to prove their cases at summary judgment 
in contested cases raises significant concerns about the integrity of the foreclosing 
parties’ conduct in foreclosure proceedings and the prevalence of basic 
documentation deficiencies.  At the same time, the mediation program has 
demonstrated some success in diverting cases away from foreclosure, thus saving 
judicial resources and providing the parties with an agreeable alternative to 
foreclosure.  This avoids the lose-lose situation the Judicial Report warned of in 
2009259 by keeping homeowners in their homes while also allowing lenders to 
recover their investment without excessive litigation fees.  It therefore follows that 
mediation should continue to be required whenever feasible to avoid the expenses 
and perils litigation has proven to carry for both homeowners and lenders alike.   
V.  SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PROGRAM 
A.  The Argument for a Broad Interpretation of the Good Faith Requirement 
Historically, the Law Court has affirmed the trial court’s authority to exercise 
its equitable powers “[w]hen necessary for the adjustment of equities between 
mortgagor and mortgagee.”260  While the adoption of the Maine Rules of Civil 
Procedure affected a merger of law and equity, the “right to a specific kind of legal 
or equitable relief upon proof of certain facts” remained unchanged.261  Several 
courts around the country have relied on the court’s equity power, the doctrine of 
unclean hands, and statutory good faith requirements in sanctioning the foreclosing 
parties’ bad faith conduct during mediation.262  While these cases raise some 
analogies to Maine’s good faith requirement in foreclosure mediation, Maine courts 
                                                                                                                 
 258. See Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. Bradbury, No. RE-09-65, at 4 (Me. Dist. Ct., Bridgton, Sept. 24, 
2010) (Powers, J.); Streitfeld, supra note 1.   
 259. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 260. Woodman v. Freeman, 25 Me. 531, 547 (1846) (citing Pratt v. Law, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 456 
(1815)).  
 261. Greenlaw v. Rodick, 158 Me. 440, 444, 185 A.2d 895, 897 (1962). 
 262. See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Mathon, No. 2007-30481, 2010 WL 4910164 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 
1, 2010) (denying judgment in foreclosure for the mortgagee and scheduling a hearing to determine the 
mortgagee’s good faith based on the grounds of the mortgagee’s unclean hands in seeking foreclosure 
after accepting thirteen modification payments in accordance with a modification agreement signed by 
both parties); BAC Home Loans Servicing v. Westervelt, No. 2455/10, 2010 WL 4702276 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Nov. 18, 2010) (denying foreclosure for the mortgagee, barring the foreclosing party from collecting 
further fees from the defendant, and sua sponte finding that the mortgagee acted in bad faith in refusing 
to follow HAMP guidelines binding on the mortgagee and in failing to appear at mediation or offer an 
adequate excuse for absence); Wells Fargo Bank v. Hughes, 897 N.Y.S.2d 605, 633-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2010) (dismissing the foreclosure action without prejudice on the basis of the mortgagee’s unclean 
hands where the mortgagee proposed a modification agreement rife with subprime lending 
characteristics contrary to New York legislation, and refused to revise the terms of the modification 
agreement at the court’s request).   
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act with clear statutory authority to require that the parties mediate in good faith.263  
However, the Law Court has not yet had occasion to pass on the proper 
interpretation of the good faith requirement.264  Meanwhile, the lower courts appear 
to have rarely found that the foreclosing party failed to participate in mediation in 
good faith.265 
This Comment proposes that the goals of the Foreclosure Diversion Program 
will be further served, and the incidence of successful mediation may be increased, 
by strict enforcement of the foreclosing parties’ compliance with a broad and 
clearly articulated interpretation of the good faith requirement of title 14, section 
6321 of the Maine Revised Statutes and Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 93(j).266  
To achieve effective foreclosure diversion, both parties must be held to a high 
standard of conduct and urged to approach mediation willing and able to fully 
participate and negotiate a meaningful resolution whenever possible.  Given the 
costs of foreclosure to all parties, the courts should be wary of foreclosing parties 
that fail to make meaningful efforts to mediate, particularly in cases in which the 
defendant is unrepresented and thus does not have full command of the normal 
adversarial safeguards.  Careful scrutiny of the mortgagee’s efforts to mediate is 
further necessitated by the documented incentive arrangements of many servicers, 
which often discourage mediation while encouraging delays and ultimately 
foreclosure, even when not in the investor’s financial best interest.267   
By sending a clear message to the foreclosing party that a meaningful effort to 
reach a negotiated solution will be required at mediation, mediators and the courts 
can further encourage mutually agreeable negotiated resolutions.  Meaningful 
mediation will also serve the protective function envisioned by the Law Court in 
Harp by subjecting the foreclosing party to “careful scrutiny for compliance with 
all procedural prerequisites at the outset of litigation” while saving precious 
judicial resources by avoiding time-consuming summary judgment 
determinations.268  By requiring strict compliance with the good faith requirement 
and heeding the Law Court’s advice in Harp, trial courts can nudge the foreclosing 
                                                                                                                 
 263. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(12) (2011); see also ME. R. CIV. P. 93(j).  At the same time, 
any expansion of the good faith requirement must necessarily be constrained by the mediation program 
requirement that mediation may not act as a waiver of either party’s rights.  ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 
6321-A(5) (2011). 
 264. See Bank of N.Y. v. Richardson, 2011 ME 38, ¶¶ 1. 5, 15 A.3d 756 (declining to address the 
trial court’s imposition of sanctions and dismissal with prejudice of the foreclosing party’s action where 
the dismissal of the bank’s claim was not a final judgment as to all asserted claims in that case).   
 265. See 2011 JUD. BRANCH REP., supra note 21, at 5 (noting that four mediation cases have resulted 
in sanctions against the foreclosing party).  The imposition of sanctions may or may not indicate a 
finding of bad faith, but a finding of bad faith would likely include the imposition of sanctions.   
 266. While clearly the court must require good faith by both parties, given the conduct of the 
foreclosing parties over the last several years, it appears that strict application of the good faith 
requirement will most frequently subject the foreclosing party to scrutiny and, in appropriate cases, 
sanctions.  This Comment in no way proposes that the mortgagor should be immune from the good faith 
requirement nor should the mortgagor be subject to a less stringent good faith standard.  However, this 
Comment proceeds on the premise that given the current challenges facing the Foreclosure Diversion 
Program, strict enforcement of the good faith requirement against the foreclosing party provides a 
promising vehicle to further the goals of the Program.   
 267. See supra Part II.B. 
 268. JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Harp, 2011 ME 5, ¶ 12 n.5, 10 A.3 718.    
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parties toward a mutually agreeable resolution to avoid foreclosure.  This includes 
providing clear incentives for accepting a negotiated solution at mediation for those 
foreclosing parties that may be unable to prove their cases at summary judgment, 
which in turn will promote fairness and efficiency for all parties involved. 
B.  What Good Faith Should Mean in the Foreclosure Mediation Context 
First, Maine law already requires that “[e]ach party and each party’s attorney, 
if any, must be present at mediation . . . and shall make a good faith effort to 
mediate all issues.”269  Likewise, the law provides that the mortgagee’s 
representative who participates in the mediation session must have the authority to 
accept a mutually agreeable negotiated solution.270  In addition, the mortgagee is 
required by statute to provide the homeowner with contact information for a 
representative authorized to modify or otherwise approve a negotiated solution to 
the action.271  The mediator and the court can give force to these provisions by 
carefully monitoring the mortgagee’s participation in mediation sessions and 
evaluating the actual authority the mortgagee’s representative has to negotiate with 
the homeowner and accept proposals that arise from the mediation.  Where the 
mortgagee’s representative fails to attend mediation and also fails to present a 
reasonable explanation for that absence, or else fails to make a properly authorized 
representative available to negotiate with the homeowner and fully consider any 
reasonable negotiated agreement modifying the loan, the mediator should include 
this information in the mediator’s report to the court as indicia of bad faith, and the 
appropriateness of sanctions should be considered.272  Lack of authority to accept a 
proposal in mediation should generally not be reason for the foreclosing party to 
reject the proposal or otherwise delay mediation.273   
Second, in order for mediation to occur, the parties’ relationships to the note 
and mortgage must be clear, as this bears directly on the parties’ authority to accept 
any modification.  Where the foreclosing party appearing at the mediation session 
has not provided proof of ownership of the note and mortgage upon filing the 
                                                                                                                 
 269. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(12) (2011).  See also ME. R. CIV. P. 93(j). 
 270. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A(11)(A) (2011). 
 271. Id. § 6111(1-A)(E). 
 272. See Bank of N.Y. v. Richardson, 2011 ME 38, ¶ 1, 15 A.3d 756.  In addition, the Nevada 
Supreme Court has ruled that where the foreclosing party does not make a representative with the power 
to modify the loan available at mediation, that party must be subject to sanctions.  Pasillas v. HSBC 
Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1283 (Nev. 2011).   
 273. Fairness would be encouraged by particular scrutiny of any unreasonable delay by the 
foreclosing party where delay in the foreclosure process often means increased fee collection 
opportunities for the servicer.  See supra Part II.B.  Furthermore, while Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 
93(j) provides a host of options that the court may consider in imposing sanctions, the court should 
consider the ultimate goal of ensuring a resolution to the foreclosure action while deterring any bad 
faith.  Insofar as Rule 93 authorizes the court to consider dismissal without prejudice or dismissal 
without prejudice with a prohibition on refilling the foreclosure action for a stated period of time, the 
court should carefully consider the effect this will have on both parties, particularly on the homeowner 
where dismissal will likely not resolve the underlying reasons for the homeowner’s original default and 
may cause the homeowner to continue to incur fee obligations to the mortgagor after dismissal.  As 
such, the net result of dismissal without prejudice will likely be that the foreclosing party is forced to 
refile the foreclosure action, thus increasing transaction costs for all parties, including the court, while 
not furthering any resolution to the foreclosure action. 
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complaint as required by title 14, section 6321 of the Maine Revised Statutes, and 
the foreclosing party is unwilling or unable to produce the relevant documents to 
comply with section 6321, this failure should be noted in the mediator’s report as 
indicia of bad faith, and sanctions should be considered.274 
Third, the homeowner is required to present a host of financial information to 
the mortgagee prior to the mediation session.275  It follows that the mortgagee’s 
representative should be required to have reasonable personal knowledge of this 
information, including the homeowner’s payment history, current income, the 
current appraisal value of the property in question, and the applicability of any 
available loss mitigation programs.  The mortgagee’s representative should also be 
prepared to timely act on that information to avoid delays due to staleness of 
financial data.  Likewise, the mortgagee’s representative should have personal 
knowledge of any known restrictions on accepting a negotiated solution provided 
by investor agreements or other agreements binding on the foreclosing party, 
including sufficient knowledge of the relevant provisions of those agreements to 
describe and explain those restrictions.  Where the mortgagee’s representative 
participates in mediation without a reasonable basis of personal knowledge of this 
information, the goals of requiring this pre-mediation exchange of information are 
defeated.  Where the mortgagee’s representative clearly lacks this basic level of 
personal knowledge and does not possess the provided documentation of this 
information that would serve as personal knowledge, the mediator’s report should 
take this into account, and the court should consider appropriate sanctions absent a 
reasonable justification by the mortgagee.276   
Fourth, where the net present value calculation and the homeowner’s income 
data indicate that it is in the mortgagee’s financial interest to modify, modification 
is presumed to be in both parties’ financial best interest unless the foreclosing party 
raises reasonable grounds for rejecting modification and provides specific 
documentation of those grounds.277  A reasonable justification shall include proof 
of the specific provisions of a valid pooling or securitization agreement or other 
valid agreement binding on the foreclosing party that restricts or prohibits the 
                                                                                                                 
 274. Nevada law requires production of documents proving ownership of the note and mortgage at 
mediation.  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 107.086(4) (2011).  The Nevada Supreme Court has held that where 
the foreclosing party fails to provide these documents at mediation, the foreclosure action cannot 
proceed, and sanctions are appropriate.  Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Co., 255 P.3d 1275, 1276-77 
(Nev. 2011); Pasillas, 255 P.3d, at 1283.  The Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling requiring sanctions 
where the foreclosing party fails to provide this proof is analogous to those situations in Maine in which 
the foreclosing party does not provide the documents required by title 14, section 6321 of the Maine 
Revised Statutes upon filing the complaint and subsequently fails to produce these documents at 
mediation. 
 275. See ME. R. CIV. P. 93(c)(4), (5). 
 276. At least one Maine District Court judge has already found that the foreclosing party is obliged to 
produce investor guidelines when the foreclosing party argues that those guidelines restrict the sorts of 
modifications the foreclosing party can accept yet alleges that the guidelines are confidential and 
therefore cannot be produced.  HSBC Bank USA v. Bowie, No. RE-09-080, at 4 (Me. Dist. Ct., York, 
Mar. 3, 2011) (Douglas, J.). 
 277. HAMP already requires that the mortgagee accept the result of the net present value calculation, 
where other HAMP requirements are met.  See supra Part II.C. 
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proposed modification or any other contemplated negotiated solution.278  Where the 
mortgagee fails to accept the result of the net present value calculation and fails to 
provide any reasonable justification for refusing to do so, including failing to 
provide any relevant documents that verify this justification, this should be noted in 
the mediator’s report as indicia of bad faith and the court should consider sanctions 
where appropriate.    
Fifth and finally, while it may appear obvious, the mediator’s report should 
take into account any unreasonable delay the foreclosing party creates in the 
mediation process.  This includes delays in any required exchange of documents or 
in making available a representative who is authorized to accept a negotiated 
solution to the foreclosure action.  Likewise, where the foreclosing party initially 
accepts a trial modification agreement through mediation but unreasonably delays 
making that modification permanent and dismissing the foreclosure action after the 
agreed-upon trial period has been completed, and the foreclosing party is unable to 
justify that delay, the mediator’s report should make note of this delay and the 
court should consider whether the foreclosing party has acted in bad faith.  Where 
delay is apparent, and no reasonable justification for that delay is forthcoming, the 
court should consider appropriate sanctions.279  
VI. CONCLUSION 
As this Comment has illustrated, Maine’s mediation program has demonstrated 
significant success in providing a fair and efficient alternative to foreclosure that 
potentially allows the homeowner to remain in the home, maximizes the investor’s 
return on the original investment, and relieves some of the burden placed on the 
court system posed by time-consuming summary judgment motions.  However, the 
success of foreclosure diversion has been challenged by a variety of factors, 
including the mortgagee’s own documentation problems and the pro se status of 
many homeowner-litigants.  Against this backdrop, strict scrutiny of summary 
judgment motions in foreclosure has proven crucial in ensuring fairness in the 
foreclosure process.  By empowering mediators and judges to carefully monitor the 
mortgagee’s good faith at mediation based on clear, predictable, and realistic 
criteria, the FDP can build on the success of the mediation program to date and 
continue to function as a model for other mediation programs around the country.    
As a last note, Bradbury, Saunders, and many other foreclosure cases 
demonstrate that the procedural fairness of the foreclosure process has relied 
heavily on the work of highly qualified volunteer and nonprofit attorneys who 
understand the foreclosure process in Maine.  Absent the dedication of these 
attorneys, the robo-signing uncovered in Bradbury may never have been 
discovered in Maine, and MERS lack of standing in Maine Courts might never 
have been successfully challenged.  These are just two of many important 
contributions by volunteer and nonprofit attorneys, yet the Bradbury and Saunders 
                                                                                                                 
 278. This requirement would comply with one Maine District Court judge’s interpretation of the 
good faith provision to require that the foreclosing party produce investor guidelines alleged by the 
party to restrict its ability to accept a modification based on the net present value calculation.  Bowie, 
No. RE-09-080, at 4.   
 279. ME. R. CIV. P. 93(j) provides a nonexclusive list of possible sanctions. 
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cases are exemplary because they both contributed to national measures to correct 
improper practices found to be rampant in foreclosure cases.280  Competent 
representation has likewise proven important in the mediation context.281  Thus, 
continued support for the representation of indigent litigants is vital to the success 
of the mediation program going forward,282 and to ensure that the adversary process 
adequately tests the strength of foreclosure actions against Maine homeowners.  
Indeed, the integrity of our system of justice depends upon it. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 280. See, e.g., ElBoghdady, supra note 15 (reporting that federal regulators reached consent 
agreements with the nation’s largest mortgage lenders to correct improper practices such as the use of 
robo-signers); Streitfeld, supra note 1. 
 281. See Foreclosed Justice, supra note 8, at 309. 
 282. For an excellent articulation of the need for increased access to counsel for low-income 
individuals facing civil litigation, see the Honorable Jonathan Lippman’s A Proactive Judicial Branch: 
Confronting the Crisis of the Unrepresented, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 1.   
